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TAKING TEXT TOO SERIOUSLY: 
MODERN TEXTUALISM, ORIGINAL 
MEANING, AND THE CASE OF AMAR'S 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
William Michael Treanor* 
Championed on the Supreme Court by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas 
and in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar, textualism has 
emerged within the past twenty years as a leading school of constitutional 
interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted 
in accordance with its original public meaning, and in seeking that mean-
ing, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the 
placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close 
parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obvi-
ously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. 
This Article uses Professor Amar's widely acclaimed masterpiece of the 
textualist movement, The Bill of Rights, as a case study to test the validity 
of that assumption. 
Amar's work has profoundly influenced subsequent scholarship and case 
law with its argument that the creation of the Bill of Rights primarily re-
flected republican rights of "the people" rather than individual rights. 
This Article shows that Amar's republican reading is incorrect and that his 
textualist interpretive approach repeatedly leads him astray. Amar incor-
rectly assumes that words have the same meaning throughout the 
document, assigns a significance to the placement of clauses that is belied 
by the drafting history, and incorrectly posits that the Bill of Rights reflects 
a unitary ideological vision. The textualist search for original public 
meaning cannot be squared with an interpretive approach that assumes 
that all word choices were made with a high degree of care, that the sig-
nificance of location can be assessed simply by examining the four comers 
of the document, and that the Constitution must be understood holistically. 
Analysis of Professor Amar's Bill of Rights indicates that, paradoxically, 
close reading is a poor guide to original meaning: rather, careful study of 
the drafting history is necessary to recapture any such understanding. 
* Dean and Paul Fuller Chair of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Earlier versions 
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Martin, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Jim Rogers, Peter Schuck, Paul Schwartz, Howard Shapiro, and Ben 
Zipursky for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Kate McLeod and the 
other members of the staff of the Fordham Law Library for invaluable research support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In less than twenty years, textualism1 has moved from the periphery of 
constitutional discourse to a position of the greatest prominence. Two jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, champion 
this interpretive approach, as do a cadre of influential academics, Akhil 
Amar most prominently among them. Constitutional textualists share a view 
that the Constitution should be read to reflect the original meaning of its 
text. They also share an assumption that they have not defended-that the 
original meaning of the text is determined by reading the document closely. 
In uncovering constitutional meaning, textualists stress precise word choice, 
placement of text in the document, and grammar: they compare related parts 
of the constitutional document and accord weight to subtle similarities and 
differences. They interpret the Constitution using the same close textual 
analysis more often associated with literary critics explicating poetry.2 
I. Although usage among acaclemics is inconsistent, in this Article textualism refers to the 
school of thought that interprets the Constitution in accordance with the text's original meaning for 
the public at the time of its adoption. Many leading textualists embrace this approach. See RoBERT 
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990) ("The search is not for subjective intention .... 
[W]hat counts is what the public understood."); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court: /999 Term, 
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) ("What counts as text 
is the document as understood by the American People who ratified and amended it, and what 
counts as history is accessible public meaning, not secret private intent."); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 548 n.22 
(1994). Others seek to interpret the Constitution in accord with "original intent"-the intent of the 
framers of constitutional text. A third approach seeks to interpret the Constitution in accordance 
with the "original understanding" of the ratifiers. I use the word originalism to refer collectively to 
the latter two approaches (original intent and original understanding). For further discussion, see 
infra Part I. 
2. For the classic work of New Criticism, the literary movement associated with such close 
reading, see WILLIAM K. WIMSATT, JR., THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 
(1954). 
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There is an obvious appeal to this approach. When textualists offer an 
interpretation that draws on an apparently close reading-when they see 
patterns previously unseen or construct a reading that appears illuminat-
ing-it would seem that they are on to something. It is like a puzzle: if all 
the pieces fit, then the puzzle has been solved. And who would argue that 
text should not be read closely? Yet a close reading may not reflect original 
meaning. It may instead reflect the creativity of the interpreter or the way a 
text is read today. 
Here is an example: Justice Thomas, Professor Amar, and others have 
assigned critical interpretive weight to the fact that, "[i]n the Constitution, 
after all, 'the United States' is consistently a plural noun."3 This grammar 
would appear to suggest that the Constitution reflects the view that the 
United States is a collection of states rather than one nation. What this read-
ing misses, however, is the fact that in the late eighteenth century, nouns 
ending in the letter s were commonly assigned plural verbs, regardless of 
whether or not the noun itself was plural. This rule was gradually displaced 
as the nineteenth century progressed.4 It is true that "United States" was of-
ten matched with a plural verb in 1787 and consistently matched with a 
singular verb after the Civil War. But one cannot conclude simply from this 
change in grammatical practice that the dominant political theory 
3. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting). See 
also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CoNSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29 (2005). Amar notes as fol-
lows: 
Thus, the text of the Constitution did not say, and the act of constitution did not do, something 
like the following: "Because the United States is [sic] already one sovereign and indivisible 
nation, the ratification of nine states shall suffice to establish this Constitution in all thirteen 
States." 
/d. The "[sic]" is from Professor Amar's book. For other examples of writers assigning significance 
to the fact that the "United States" takes a plural verb in the Constitution, see FoRREST McDoNALD, 
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 20-22 (2000); Jay S. 
Bybee, Common Ground: Roben Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 75 TuL. L. REv. 251, 324 n.445 (2000); and Robert F. Nagel. Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. 
L. REv. 985, 994 n.34 (1997). While Professor Amar and Justice Thomas both accord weight to the 
verb choice, they understand its significance differently. Justice Thomas contends that "the people of 
each State retained their separate political identities." U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Professor Amar contends instead that ratification of the Constitution ended each state's 
sovereign status. AMAR, supra, at 33. 
It should be noted that earlier in his career, Amar had taken a somewhat different approach, 
noting that "United States" takes a plural verb in the Constitution but, in light of other textual evi-
dence, simply dismissing the significance of the grammar: 
Indeed, the Constitution's consistent use of the phrase "the United States" as a plural noun only 
serves to cast further doubt on the self-evident correctness of the conventional reading of the 
Preamble's opening phrase. However, a closer look at the rest of the Constitution reveals sev-
eral other provisions that can help the Preamble's overworked opening words bear the 
argumentative load. 
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1455 (1987) (footnote omit-
ted). 
4. See STERLING ANDRUS LEONARD, THE DocTRINE OF CORRECTNESS IN ENGLISH USAGE, 
1700-1800, at 221 (1962). 
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changed-the same verb shift occurred for the word news, 5 and there was no 
reconceptualization of news. Grammar offers a full explanation for the 
6 grammar. 
As this example indicates, close readings of the text do not always cap-
ture original meaning. The close reading advanced by textualists with 
respect to the meaning of the "United States" in the original Constitution 
reflects the erroneous premise that a modem rule regarding plural verbs was 
also the rule in effect in the late eighteenth century. This example illustrates 
a larger point: textualists have simply assumed that close readings reliably 
capture original meaning. Critics of textualism have not questioned that as-
sumption. This Article challenges the equation of a modem (and a 
historical) close reading with the actual original public meaning of the text, 
and instead it argues for the critical importance of evidence such as drafting 
and ratifying history-evidence many textualists minimize or ignore-as a 
guide. 
In a recent article on the origins of judicial review, I looked at early 
cases involving constitutional challenges of statutes. I found that these opin-
ions reflect an approach to interpretation that is, at its core, structural, not 
textualist. When engaged in constitutional interpretation, as a general mat-
ter, early judges did not closely parse text. Instead, their approach reflected 
a concern with the larger purposes underlying the text.7 
Rather than studying judicial opinions, this Article approaches the prob-
lem of the relationship between modern textualism and original meaning 
from a different angle, using a case study to show the dramatic gap between 
textualist readings and original meaning. The case study is Professor Amar's 
book The Bill of Rights.8 
Amar's book has had a broad influence on scholarly debate and case law 
as the leading academic work championing a republican, group-rights 
(rather than a liberal, individual-rights) reading of the Bill of Rights. This 
5. See 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 374 (2d ed. 1989) (providing usages of the word 
news). The last example of the word news taking a plural verb is a usage by Shelley in 1821./d. 
6. My point here is not that the founders thought of the United States as a single sovereign 
but rather that the usage of a plural verb in conjunction with "United States" in the Constitution 
does not prove one way or the other what the founders' political theory was. Both MartinS. Flaherty 
and Henry Paul Monaghan offer further discussion of the founders' theory on sovereignty. Martin S. 
Flaherty, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and "We the People": Revisions in Need of Revis-
ing, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1339 (2002) (analyzing competing schools of thought); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, We the People[ sf, Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendmem, 96 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 121, 138 (1996). Monaghan notes as follows: 
To my eyes, neither completely state-centered nor completely nationalist views of the 
founding capture the original understanding .... A significant number of Americans simulta-
neously held-in varying mixtures and intensities-some concept of a "We the People" of the 
United States and (more importantly for my argument) some concept of a "We the People" of 
Delaware, and so on. 
Monaghan, supra, at 138. 
7. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455 (2005). 
For further discussion of what the conclusions in my earlier article suggest about the founding gen-
eration's interpretive approach, see infra Part I. 
8. AKHIL REEDAMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
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Article shows why his argument is dramatically misconceived. My primary 
concern here, however, is on textualism, and I have chosen to focus on Amar 
and his book for several reasons. 
First, Amar has written more extensively on textualism and has worked 
out its methodology and implications far more fully than anyone else, in-
cluding Justice Scalia. His Harvard Law Review Foreword The Document 
and the Doctrine9 and his article Intratextualism 10 develop his approach and 
discuss the various textualist techniques he applies. In The Bill of Rights he 
brings those techniques to bear in an extended, textualist study of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In applying his textualist approach, 
Amar evidences a trait shared by many leading practitioners of textualism: 
while not wholly ignoring drafting history and textual usages outside the 
constitutional document, he relegates these evidentiary sources to secondary 
importance. His central focus is on the text, and it is assumed that close 
reading yields original meaning. 
Second, while Amar is politically liberal, his textualism has been enthu-
siastically and repeatedly embraced by leading conservatives as the 
preeminent embodiment of proper textualist methodology. Michael Paulsen 
has proclaimed Amar's America's Constitution 11 the finest book about the 
Constitution since the Federalist Papers. 12 The Bill of Rights and the articles 
from which it was derived have been repeatedly cited by Justice Thomas and 
Justice Scalia,n and leading textualist Gary Lawson has called The Bill of 
Rights "one of the best law books of the twentieth century."14 Stephen 
Calabresi, another leading textualist, has declared The Bill of Rights to be 
"one of the most valuable works of constitutional scholarship written in the 
modern era." 15 He adds that "Professor Amar has now indubitably proven 
that we can reconstruct original meanings with a very high degree of 
9. Amar, supm note I. 
10. Akhil Reed Amar, lntmtextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, 
lntratextualism ]; see also Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997 (2006) [hereinafter Amar, Yale School]. 
II. AMAR. supra note 3. 
12. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE 
L.J. 2037, 2038 (2006). 
13. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. I, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Akhil Reed Amar, An Open Letter to Pmfes-
.mrs Paulsen and Powell, 115 YALE L.J. 2101, 2109 n.24 (2006) (describing Professor Amar's 
influence on Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
14. Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 511 
( 1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 8). 
15. Stephen G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273,2274 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 8). 
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accuracy." 16 As the preeminent textualist scholar, Amar is an appropriate 
representative of the methodology. 17 
Third, if the panoply of close-reading techniques that Amar and other 
textualists champion and employ ever tracks original meaning, the Bill of 
Rights is precisely where one would expect that tracking to occur. While 
Amar, in what is essentially a companion volume to his book on the Bill of 
Rights, has written a textualist interpretation of the entire Constitution, 18 his 
view that constitutional provisions are each "part of a single coherent Con-
stitution"19 and that they are reflective of a "deep design"20 does not easily fit 
with the reality of the framing. The series of compromises between sharply 
divided factions at the Constitutional Convention and a textual finish by 
Gouverneur Morris produced many of the constitutional features that textu-
alists highlight. But members of the Convention often dispensed with them 
after little, if any, significant discussion.21 And the adoption of subsequent 
amendments makes it more difficult to see the Constitution as a text to be 
understood as one piece. In contrast, the Bill of Rights avoids these prob-
lems. It is a significant body of text, permitting links to be explored without 
considering other parts of the Constitution. It was also produced at one time 
and in large part written by one person. This avoids reading too much into 
similarities in language written at different times or that was the result of 
political compromises. The Bill of Rights is the part of the Constitution for 
which the close reading of Amar and other modern textualists would seem 
most likely to accord with original meaning. 
Finally, Amar is a constitutional scholar of remarkable intelligence and 
interpretive skill. He is not simply the leading textualist scholar: he is one of 
the most creative, insightful, and influential constitutional law scholars of 
the modern era. 
In sum, in choosing this author and this book as a test case, I have very 
consciously chosen both textualism's preeminent academic advocate and the 
case in which strong claims for close reading would appear most plausible. 
The textualist approach that Professor Amar employs, however, does not 
16. /d. at 2275. 
17. The fact that leading textualists have embraced Amar's historical account does not mean 
that it has won universal acceptance. Perhaps the most sustained challenge has come from Professor 
Henry Monaghan. Professor Monaghan's article We the People[s], Original Understanding, and 
Constitutional Amendment argues at length that Professor Amar's contention "that despite Article V, 
the Framers intended that a simple majority of a national 'We the People' could amend the Constitu-
tion" is "historically groundless." Monaghan, supra note 6, at 121. Monaghan's challenges are 
aimed at two of Amar's articles: Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amend me Ill Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994 ); and Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia 
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988). 
18. AMAR, supra note 3. 
19. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 822. 
20. /d. at 814. 
21. See infra Section I. B. 
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allow us to "reconstruct original meanings with a very high degree of accu-
racy,"22 to put it mildly. 
Part I of this Article discusses textualism's rise as a response to the 
power of the scholarly critique of originalism and Professor Amar's leading 
role in the academy as an expositor and practitioner of textualism. It sets 
forth the canons of interpretation he has articulated-his focus on place-
ment, unified ideological vision, and textual linkages among parts of the 
document-and the republican reading of the Bill of Rights that he uses 
textualism to defend. 
Part II then examines one of Professor Amar's central claims to illustrate 
how his textualism leads him far from the original meaning he seeks to re-
cover. Amar argues that the Ninth Amendment is primarily concerned, not 
with the protection of individual rights, but rather with the people's right to 
alter or abolish government. In advancing this view, he stresses location-
and in particular the fact that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next to 
each other and should thus be read together. He also relies on a close read-
ing of the text: the Amendment protects "rights ... retained by the people,"23 
and he argues that the words "the people" have a "conspicuously collective 
meaning."24 I show, however, that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next 
to each other by purest happenstance. They were originally parts of 
Madison's proposed Fourth and Eighth Amendments, respectively. They 
were meant to be inserted into the constitutional text rather than appended at 
the end, and they ultimately came together because of a series of decisions 
that had nothing to do with any sense that they were a unit. Similarly, exam-
ining the history of the Constitution's ratification and the Ninth 
Amendment's drafting shows that, at the time of the Bill of Rights, the 
phrase "rights [of] the people" was not conspicuously collective but instead 
encompassed individual rights at least as much as collective rights. 
Part III shows how Amar's misreading of the Ninth Amendment exem-
plifies the fundamental problems that undermine his analysis of the Bill of 
Rights and, more basically, his claim that his textualism reveals original 
meaning. Specifically, it examines the three critical premises of his interpre-
tive approach: ( 1) that through the repetition of words and phrases, 
constitutional clauses gloss each other and reveal underlying meaning; 
(2) that the location of clauses in the Constitution reveals meaning; and 
(3) that the document must be understood as a coherent whole. Each tenet is 
deeply flawed: ( 1) a focus on the way words are used in the document over-
looks other, equally relevant evidence concerning meaning; (2) the location 
of clauses is of very limited significance, and that significance cannot be 
determined without close consideration of drafting history; (3) and the Con-
stitution does not reflect a consistent underlying ideology. 
22. Calabresi, supra note 15, at 2275. 
23. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX. 
24. AMAR, supra note 8, at 120. 
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This Article is a work of history, not of constitutional theory. My con-
cern here is not to argue that close-reading textualism should be rejected as 
a matter of constitutional theory. Modern textualists embrace an approach 
that, at its core, involves interpretation of a popularly enacted document (the 
Constitution) using a methodology that reflects neutral principles (the prin-
ciples of close-reading textualism) rather than the constitutional ideology of 
the interpreter. It thus has two theoretical justifications. First, it constrains 
judges from deciding cases in accordance with their own values by giving 
them interpretive principles to apply.25 One can question how true this is. 
Given that Professor Amar, its leading academic proponent, is a liberal and 
that Justice Scalia, its leading judicial practitioner, is a conservative, it 
would appear that close-reading textualism is not terribly constraining. 
Nonetheless, I am not concerned with rebutting the argument that close-
reading textualism is an attractive interpretive approach because it strongly 
anchors judicial decision making. 
My concern is with the historical underpinning of the second justifica-
tion of textualism: that it has a majoritarian basis because it recaptures the 
meaning that the document had when adopted.26 Using Amar's Bill of Rights 
as a case study, this Article argues that close-reading textualism is a deeply 
flawed guide to original meaning because the assumptions a reader such as 
Amar brings to bear in interpreting a text are not those of the founding gen-
eration. While Amar's account reflects a significant number of mistakes 
concerning the historical record, the critical problem with his approach is 
caused not by those errors but by his underlying assumption that careful 
reading of the text consistently reveals original meaning. To recover draft-
ers' and ratifiers' intent, originalists look carefully at drafting and ratifying 
debates and background usages of constitutional terms. Although Amar ex-
amines these materials, he does not do so rigorously because he is primarily 
concerned with text. But close attention to historical sources is necessary to 
recapture the text's original meaning. 
Amar writes: "Textualism presupposes that the specific constitutional 
words ultimately enacted were generally chosen with care. Otherwise, why 
bother reading closely?"27 But while the Constitution and Bill of Rights 
were the product of extensive deliberation, they were not written with either 
the extraordinary concern for word choice and placement or the common 
vision that Amar posits. The founders were not writing a poem, and the in-
terpretive assumptions a modern reader makes in closely reading the text 
can lead her dramatically astray from original meaning. 
25. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44-47 (1997); Amar, supra note I, at 
53-54; A mar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 798; Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil. 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857 (1989); see also RALPH A. RosSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA's JURISPRU-
DENCE 27 (2006). 
26. Amar, supra note I, at 27-37; Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 748-55; see also 
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 37-41. 
27. Amar, supra note I, at 29. 
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I. TEXTUALISM, HOLISTIC l'EXTUALISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR 
ORIGINAL MEANING 
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Textualism's prominence in constitutional law is a recent phenomenon: 
in the late 1980s, for instance, legal commentators observed that direct reli-
ance on text played comparatively little role in constitutional adjudication.28 
The rise of textualism reflects several factors. 
It was, in part, a reaction to the perception that Warren and Burger Court 
decisions reflected the justices' personal values and thus were unconstrained 
by principle or majoritarian sanction.29 Because the basic premise of textual-
ism is that judges should decide cases by construing a popularly adopted 
text on the basis of what that text meant at the time it was adopted, textual-
ism responded to concerns about constraining judges and providing 
majoritarian legitimacy. Thus, Justice Scalia observed, "the text of the Con-
stitution, and our traditions, say what they say and there is no fiddling with 
them."3° Champions of textualism argue that textualism is appropriate be-
cause it gives judges a set of rules that were adopted by the people and that 
the people have never changed.31 
Textualism's rise to prominence is also due to the power of academic at-
tacks on originalism. Textualism and originalism are closely allied schools of 
interpretation. Justice Scalia described himself as an originalist in an article he 
wrote in 1989.32 However, in A Matter of Interpretation, his most recent 
scholarly work on constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia classifies his 
approach to the Constitution as textualise3: "What I look for in the Constitu-
tion is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, 
not what the original draftsmen intended."34 In his Harvard Foreword 
28. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 234 (1980) (noting that text is of limited importance in case law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1195 
( 1987) ("If there is any surprise, it is how seldom the text is relied on directly, in comparison with 
arguments based on historical intent, precedent, and social policy or moral principle."); Thomas C. 
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1975) ("In the im-
portant cases, reference to and analysis of the constitutional text plays a minor role."). Justice Scalia 
was not the modem era's first textualist on the Supreme Court. Justice Black was a textualist. For a 
comparison of the textualism of Justice Scalia and Justice Black, see Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of 
Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25 (1994). 
29. See Jeffrey Rosen, Textualism and the Constitution: Introduction, 66 GEo. WASH. L. 
REV. 1081 (1998). 
30. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
31. For examples of this argument, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER· 
PRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 152-57 (1999); Lilian 
R. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: A Question of Time, or Law?, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 
1112 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119, 
1121 (1998); and Scalia, supra note 25, at 862. 
32. See Scalia, supra note 25, at 862. 
33. See SCALIA, supra note 25, at 24-25,37-41. 
34. /d. at 38. 
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The Document and the Doctrine, Professor Amar offers a similar conception 
of textualism: 
I mean to defend a spacious but not unbounded version of constitutional 
textualism. On this view, textual analysis dovetails with the study of en-
actment history and constitutional structure. The joint aim of these related 
approaches is to understand what the American People meant and did 
when We ratified and amended the document. 
... What counts as text is the document as understood by the American 
People who ratified and amended it, and what counts as history is accessi-
ble public meaning, not secret private intent. 15 
Following Justice Scalia and Professor Amar, I use the term textualism 
to refer to the school of thought that seeks to construe the Constitution in 
accordance with the original meaning of the text. Originalism, in contrast, is 
the overarching term for two related approaches: proponents of original in-
tent seek to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the intent of the 
drafters, while proponents of original understanding seek to interpret the 
Constitution in accordance with the understanding of the ratifiers. 36 Textual-
ism thus represents a search for the public meaning of constitutional text at 
the time that text was written and ratified: originalism reflects a search for 
the subjective intent of particular sets of historical actors. 
Originalism, rather than textualism, was the first prominent response to 
value-based constitutionalism. 37 But academics criticized originalism on 
historicist grounds. They questioned whether original intent or original un-
derstanding could be discovered. They argued that discerning how a group 
of people interpreted particular words was problematic--even if there were 
strong evidence as to how the text was interpreted-because some in the 
group may not have considered particular issues and because many may 
have disagreed.38 Perhaps more importantly, in a widely influential article, 
The Original Understanding of Original Intent,39 H. Jefferson Powell argued 
that the original understanding was that original understanding was irrele-
35. Amar, supra note I, at 28-29. 
36. For helpful discussion of relevant terminology, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEAN-
INGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 ( 1996). 
37. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363 (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971 ); Edwin Meese III, Address 
before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, in INTERPRETING LAW AND 
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 25 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); 
Edwin Meese III, The Battle For The Constitution: The Attomey General Replies to His Critics, 35 
PoL'Y REV. 32, 34 (1985), reprinted in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 22, 26 (1985); Edwin Meese III, 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, II HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 5 (1988); William H. 
Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
38. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 38-57 (1985); Brest, supra note 
28, at 209-17; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 723,726 (1988). 
39. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (1985). 
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vant.40 Powell thus neatly turned originalism on its head: if Powell were 
right, a true originalist would reject original intent. 
Significantly, neither of these arguments from history undermined textu-
alism. Powell's evidence only bore on whether the framers' intent (original 
intent) was relevant to constitutional interpretation, not whether the ratifiers' 
intent (original understanding) was relevant.41 More fundamentally, as Henry 
Monaghan observed, the problematic character of searching for how a group 
of people read constitutional text (a search at the heart of both original intent 
and original understanding) suggested a distinct strategy: 
The relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the lan-
guage when the Constitution was developed. Hamilton put it well: 
"whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or 
of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, accord-
ing to the usual & established rules of construction."42 
Similarly, historian Jack Rakove argued that the record of the founding indi-
cates that the framers believed "[t]he text and structure of the document 
would provide the locus of interpretation; historical evidence of the debates 
would not be relevant."43 In short, textualism has the same fundamental ap-
peal as originalism-both interpretive schools claimed the virtues of 
determinacy and majoritarian sanction-but it was not subject to the same 
historical attacks. 
Finally, textualism's rise is a product of the fact that two textualists, Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Thomas, were named to the Supreme Court. Their 
opinions have given textualism an important place in modem constitutional 
case law, and Justice Scalia's academic writings44 have been widely influen-
tial.45 
In reading constitutional text, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have 
not limited themselves to the Constitution and contemporaneous dictionar-
ies. Although in one case Justice Scalia pointedly refused to join the part of 
a majority opinion that relied on the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, implying that he viewed this history as irrelevant to constitu-
tional interpretation,46 in other cases he and Justice Thomas have drawn on 
40. /d. at 948. 
41. For a convincing analysis in this regard, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT 77 (1988). 
42. Monaghan, supra note 38, at 725 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an 
Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 97, Ill (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965)) (footnote omitted). 
43. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. CoM-
MENT 159, 164-65 (1996). 
44. See supra note 25. 
45. For further discussion of the rise of originalism and the subsequent rise of textual ism, see 
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Draft-
ing History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003), and Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonorigina/ists, 45 Lov. L. REv. 611,611-29 (1999). 
46. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 n. (1997). For discussion, see Kesavan & 
Paulsen, supra note 45, at 1119-20. 
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constitutional debating history, including the nonpublic debates of the 
Philadelphia framers.47 Because Justice Scalia strongly rejects legislative 
history when analyzing statutes, his use of debating history is arguably in-
consistent. John Manning, however, has defended this practice as consistent 
with textualism because textualists "might examine the way reasonable per-
sons actually understood a text, giving such evidence particular force if 
those persons had special familiarity with the temper and events of the times 
that produced that text."48 Justice Scalia has offered a similar justification: 
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention-Hamilton's and Madison's writings in The 
Federalist, for example. I do so, however, not because they were Framers 
and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be the Jaw; but rather 
because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people 
of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally under-
stood. Thus I give equal weight to Jay's pieces in The Federalist, and to 
Jefferson's writings, even though neither of them was a Framer. What I 
look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the 
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.'9 
Debating history is relevant as evidence of usage, particularly as it illumi-
nates the use of terms in their relevant context. 5° 
Even as they draw on history, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas's in-
quiry is about the public meaning of text. In propounding what they see as 
the public meaning of various constitutional provisions, they have created a 
substantial body of opinions turning on close readings. Thus in Harmelin v. 
Michigan and again in Walton v. Arizona, Justice Scalia stresses that the 
4 7. See infra note 50. 
48. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (1998); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the 
Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
1301, 1319-20 (1998) (suggesting that textualists might use constitutional history but not legislative 
history because of the possibility that the latter will be subject to manipulation by legislative partici-
pants in the future while the relevant materials in constitutional history have already been 
produced). 
49. SCALIA, supra note 25, at 38. 
50. Justice Scalia's testimony during his confirmation hearings was to the same effect. He 
observed that, "if somebody should discover that the secret intent of the framers was quite different 
from what the words seem to connote, it would not make any difference" as far as he was con-
cerned. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 108 (1986), quoted in 
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307 (1990). 
This rejection of drafters' intent does not mean that Justice Scalia has categorically refused to draw 
on the nonpublic debates of the Philadelphia drafters: he has. See. e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 720 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 
(1988). Justice Thomas has also relied on the Philadelphia debates. On Justice Thomas's use of 
historical sources, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There 
Less Here than Meets the Eye, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 248-49, 303-04 (2005). For an 
example of Justice Thomas's use of the Philadelphia debates, see United States v. lnt'l Bus. Mach. 
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1996). For discussion of the use of the Philadelphia debates by Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1119-20, 1186 (2003 ). 
December 2007) Taking Text too Seriously 499 
Eighth Amendment bars "cruel and unusual" punishment, not "cruel or un-
usual" punishment.51 In his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia 
posits that the use of the word "inferior" in the Vesting Clause of Article III 
illuminates the use of the word "inferior" in the Appointments Clause of 
Article II, 52 and in his opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner he turns to the 
usage of the term "Courts of Law" in Article III to support his understanding 
of that term in the Appointments Clause of Article Il.53 In Kelo v. City of 
New London, Justice Thomas defines "public use" in the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause by reference to the way in which the word "use" is em-
ployed in Article I clauses governing the levying of duties on imports and 
exports by states and the raising of an army by Congress, and he argues that 
if the original understanding of federal eminent domain power had been a 
broad one, the phrase "general welfare," employed in the Preamble and in 
the General Welfare Clause of Article I, would have been employed in the 
Fifth Amendment instead of "public use."54 In United States v. Lopez, Justice 
Thomas supports his argument that the word "commerce" in the Commerce 
Clause is limited to sale and transport by arguing that that is how the word 
"commerce" is understood in the Port Preference Clause,55 and in U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, he finds significance in the fact that, in the Consti-
tution, the term "United States" takes a plural verb. 56 
While they closely parse the Constitution's text, neither Justice has tried 
to systematically work out canons of textualist interpretation. The scholar 
who has most fully attempted to work out and apply a textualist methodol-
ogy is Professor Amar. His article lntratextualism and his Harvard Foreword 
The Document and the Doctrine are largely methodological, and his books 
The Bill of Rights and America's Constitution demonstrate that methodology 
at work. Leading textualist scholars have repeatedly and consistently 
51. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,670 
( 1990) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). A textualist might respond to my highlighting of these 
cases by observing that Justice Scalia was simply following the constitutional text and that the 
Eighth Amendment, after all, uses "and;' not "or." But Justice Scalia is making an assumption here 
about how people at the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratification would have construed the 
phrasing, and his assumption reflects current usage. Eighteenth-century courts, however, were capa-
ble of reading "and" as "or" when the facts warranted. See Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, I U.S. (I Dall.) 
175, 178 (Pa. 1786) ("The words of the Act are, after the death of any father and mother, so that he 
was not within the words; but I am of opinion, that the word and, in this place, must be construed or 
.... "). Professor Eskridge uses Kerlin's Lessee to illustrate the fact that courts at the time of the 
founding engaged in equitable interpretation of statutes. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Wonts: 
Early Understandings Of The "Judicial Power" In Statutory Interpretation, 1776--1806, 101 
CoLUM. L. REv. 990, 1022-23 (2001). The related point here is that it cannot be assumed that eight-
eenth-century interpreters would have read constitutional text closely the way Justice Scalia, Justice 
Thomas, and Professor Amar do. 
52. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
53. Freytag v. Comm., 501 U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
54. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509-10 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
56. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting). For 
discussion, see supra text accompanying note 3. 
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applauded Amar's approach as constitutionalism of the highest order and 
have embraced his conclusions.57 His work is therefore a fitting subject of 
analysis to determine whether constitutional textualism tracks original 
meaning. 
This Part discusses Professor Amar's methodology and its implications 
in The Bill of Rights. Before beginning that discussion, however, I would 
like to discuss prior scholarship on the interpretive approaches of the found-
ing generation. While constitutional textualists embrace what I call close-
reading textualism, no one has explained why the conventions they employ 
capture the way the text was originally read.58 Amar and others such as Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Thomas simply assume that close readings capture 
original meaning. No one has argued that textualists' interpretive practices 
do not capture original meaning. 
This Article grapples with the question of whether close-reading textual-
ism captures original meaning. The most relevant scholarly debate concerns 
the original interpretive practices governing the reading of statutes (rather 
than the Constitution). John Manning, the leading academic voice in the 
modern textualist movement in statutory interpretation, has argued that 
originalist evidence best comports with the "faithful agent" theory under 
which "judges have a duty to discern and enforce legislative instructions as 
accurately as possible and to abide by those commands when legislative 
intent is clear."59 Although not rigidly literal, Manning's account stresses the 
extent to which, in the founding era, statutes were seen as determinate in 
meaning, and the judicial role was highly constrained because of this textual 
determinacy. William Eskridge has responded with his own, very different, 
analysis of founding-era historical evidence of statutory interpretation: 
The central Jesson of the early period, best embodied in the work of John 
Marshall, is that statutory interpretation is all about words, but words are 
about much more than dictionaries and ordinary usage; they also involve 
policies chosen by the legislature and enduring principles suggested by the 
common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution.''" 
In the realm of constitutional interpretation, this Article reaches conclu-
sions that parallel those Eskridge reached with respect to statutory 
interpretation. Eskridge stresses the nontextual sources of statutory meaning 
and the ways in which equitable concerns shaped judicial decisions. Simi-
larly, I challenge the view that text-focused interpretation-paying careful 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16. 
58. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519-
21 (2003) (noting the dearth of work on recovering the founders' interpretive conventions). Profes-
sor Nelson's superb study is, in a limited way, an exception. He is concerned with a particular 
convention (which is not one at issue in this Article}-whether the founding genemtion thought that 
early practice "fixed" the meaning of ambiguous constitutional text. See id. at 521-23. 
59. John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1648 n.l (2001}; see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the 
Statute, I 0 I CoLUM. L. REv. I (200 I) (presenting a historical case for "faithful agent" approach). 
60. Eskridge, supra note 51, at 998. 
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attention to the words of the Constitution and their placement and assuming 
a unitary ideological vision-captures original meaning. I show that that 
approach reflects erroneous assumptions about the way the founders under-
stood the document. 
This Article is also consistent with my earlier work on the original un-
derstanding of judicial review, although that earlier work did not primarily 
address textualist claims.61 My previous article showed that judicial review 
was more common than previously recognized. I argued that early case law 
reflects a structural and process-based approach to judicial review rather 
than a textualist approach. Structural concerns, rather than the parsing of 
texts, were the dominant influence on these decisions. Courts understood 
constitutional prohibitions very broadly in certain areas and viewed statutes 
with complete deference in others. 
Both Eskridge's work on the original understanding of statutory inter-
pretation and my work on the original understanding of judicial review 
indicate that the founding generation, when confronted with questions of 
interpretation, did not closely parse text. But modern constitutional textual-
ists such as Amar assume that the founders approached constitutional text 
with extraordinary care; they posit that the Constitution reflects a coherent, 
unified vision and that its words were chosen and its clauses placed with 
extraordinary attention. This is an error, and this Article shows how it leads 
to misunderstandings of original meaning. 
A. Amar's Textualism 
In his Foreword The Document and the Doctrine and in his article ln-
tratextualism, Professor Amar sets forth a series of interpretive techniques 
for reading the Constitution. He posits that the Constitution should be read 
holistically, that the words and phrases used in the Constitution should be 
used to gloss other words and phrases in the Constitution, and that location 
matters. 
In arguing for "read[ing] holistically,"62 Amar claims that the various 
parts of the Constitution reflect a common vision: "How could we forget 
that our Constitution is a single document, and not a jumble of disconnected 
clauses-that it is a Constitution we are expounding?"63 It is a "single co-
herent constitution"64 manifesting "a deep design"65 : 
The American People ratified the Philadelphia Constitution not clause by 
clause, but as a single document. Later generations of Americans have 
added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a 
61. See Treanor, supra note 7. 
62. /d. at 30. 
63. AMAR, supra note 8, at 125; see also Amar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 795 (argu-
ing that interpreters should "take[) seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab 
bag of assorted clauses"). 
64. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 822. 
65. /d. at 814. 
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discrete legal regime. Each amendment aims to fit with, and be read as part 
of, the larger document. Indeed, because the People have chosen to affix 
amendments to the end of the document rather than directly rewrite old 
clauses, a reader can never simply look to an old clause and be done with 
it. Rather, she must always scour later amendments to see if they explicitly 
or implicitly modify the clause at hand. To do justice to these basic facts 
about the text, we must read the document holistically and attend to its 
overarching themes.66 
Thus Amar's approach to constitutional interpretation begins, as Adrian 
Vermeule and Ernest Young have observed, with the assumption that the 
Constitution "displays strong substantive coherence across different provi-
sions."67 
Amar calls his glossing technique "intratextualism."68 lntratextualism as-
signs interpretive weight to the "important word patterns in the 
Constitution."69 This analysis can proceed in three ways. Uses of a word 
elsewhere in the Constitution can illustrate what the term means: "[T]he 
Constitution ... thus serves a basic dictionary function."70 Intratextualism 
can also involve "[u]sing the Constitution as a [c]oncordance ... enabling 
and encouraging us to place nonadjoining clauses alongside each other for 
analysis because they use the same (or very similar) words and phrases. 
Once we accept the invitation to read noncontiguous provisions together, we 
may see important patterns at work."71 The final type of intratextualism 
"demands that two (or more) similarly phrased constitutional commands be 
read in pari materia .... [W]e read the commands as if a metacommand 
clause existed telling us to construe parallel commands in parallel fashion."72 
Summing up the three types of intratextualism, Amar writes: "To oversim-
plify slightly: dictionary-like intratextualism tells us what the Constitution 
could mean; concordance-like intratextualism tells us what it should mean; 
and rulebook-like intratextualism tells us what it must mean."73 
Finally, Amar argues for "squeez[ing] meaning from the Constitution's 
organization chart."74 While intratextualism focuses on word patterns, this 
approach focuses on the placement of clauses and figures heavily in Amar's 
book on the Bill of Rights. In Intratextualism, Amar suggests a variety of 
other ways in which this approach could illuminate constitutional meaning: 
66. Amar, supra note I, at 29-30; see also Amar, Yale School, supra note 10, at 2001 ("Be-
cause the document forms a coherent whole, sensitive readers must go beyond individual clauses to 
ponder the larger constitutional systems, patterns, structures, and relationships at work."). 
67. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herben, and Amar: The Trouble with 
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REv. 730, 749 (2000). 
68. Amar,lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 748. 
69. Amar, supra note I, at 30. 
70. A mar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 791. 
71. !d. at 792-93. 
72. /d. at 794-95. 
73. /d. at 795. 
74. /d. at 797 n.I97. 
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Arguments in this tradition might point to the special place of textual 
honor held by the Constitution's first three words as evidence of popular 
sovereignty as the document's first principle; or to the very existence of 
separate Articles I, II, and III as evidence of the separation of powers and 
the coextensiveness of the three great federal departments; or to the 
firstness of Article I as evidence of Congress' primacy; or to the location of 
the Veto clause in Article I as evidence that this presidential power is legis-
lative in nature. 75 
503 
Amar believes that some of the textual linkages that holistic readings re-
veal were consciously intended. "Other times," he acknowledges, "the 
pattern that we discern upon reflection may not have been specifically in-
tended, but is still far from random."76 Yet regardless of whether it is 
specifically intended or not, this form of textual analysis is a source of in-
sight for the constitutional interpreter: 
A great play may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly 
in the playwright's mind when the muse came; ordinary language contains 
depths of association that not even our best poets fully understand, even as 
they intuit; and a judicial opinion may build better than its author knew. So 
too with the Constitution.77 
Amar believes that textual readings should reflect an understanding of 
history: 
By pondering the public legislative history of these carefully chosen 
words, we can often learn more about what they meant to the American 
People who enacted them as the supreme law of the land. Thus, good his-
torical narrative, in both a broad (epic-events) sense and a narrow 
(drafting/ratification) sense, should inform good textual analysis; with un-
canny economy, the text often distills hard-won historical lessons and 
drafting insights. 78 
Both debating history and the broader history of an era bear on constitu-
tional understanding. But the words of the document remain at the center of 
the analysis. In Amar's formulation, "[a] good historical narrative ... should 
inform good textual analysis."79 History is relevant, not as an independent 
guide to meaning, but because it illuminates text. 
75. /d. Amar also describes a related interpretive doctrine that he calls intertextualism. Inter-
textualism involves "comparisons between clauses in the Constitution on one hand and clauses in 
other documents on the other." /d. at 795 n.186. In practice, however, he accords great weight inter-
pretive weight to intratextualism (related words in the Constitution) and little to words in other 
documents. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933, 1961 n.l34 
(2003) ("[Amar] notes but does not make much use of 'intertextualism,' juxtapositions of constitu-
tional wordings with other phrasings in other documents."). Not surprisingly, while he has written a 
major article on intratextualism, he has not written an article on intertextualism. A fundamental 
element of his interpretive approach is to privilege the constitutional text above other sources. 
76. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 10, at 793. 
77. !d. at 793-94. 
78. Amar, supra note I, at 29. 
79. /d. (emphasis added). 
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B. Amar's Bill of Rights and Original Meaning 
Professor Amar provides only a limited number of case studies of his 
approach in The Document and the Doctrine and Intratextualism. His book 
The Bill of Rights provides a richer illustration of his textualist approach. 
This Section will look at the conclusions he reaches in that book and discuss 
his claim that the conclusions he derives from close-reading textualism re-
flect original meaning. Subsequent Parts will show how he uses his close 
reading of the text to reach the conclusions embraced in The Bill of Rights 
and how those conclusions are fundamentally at odds with original meaning. 
In The Bill of Rights, Amar employs textualism to alter the pedigree of 
the Constitution's protection of individual liberties. "The essence of the Bill 
of Rights," he contends, "was more structural than not, and more majori-
tarian than counter."80 The original Bill of Rights "seems largely republican 
and collective, sounding mainly in political rights, in the public liberty of 
the ancients.',s1 It is "a document attentive to structure, focused on the 
agency problem of government, and rooted in the sovereignty of We the 
People of the United States."82 The "agency problem"-the focus of the Bill 
of Rights-was "the danger that government officials might attempt to rule 
in their own self-interest at the expense of their constituents' sentiments and 
liberty.''83 
While Amar sees the Bill of Rights as protecting certain individual 
rights, that was "not the sole, or even the dominant, motif'84 of the docu-
ment. The founders were concerned primarily with government's ability to 
deny the majority power: "[l]n the 1780s, liberty was still centrally under-
stood as public liberty of democratic self-government-majoritarian liberty 
rather than liberty against popular majorities."85 "Madison thought other-
wise," Amar adds, "but [he] was a man ahead of his time."86 Thus the fact 
that Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, was not part of what 
Amar depicts as the consensus view is both noted and dismissed. Indeed, the 
vision underlying the Bill of Rights was not, at its base, a Federalist vision. 
Rather, the Bill of Rights reflected Anti-Federalism: ''To some extent, 
[Madison's] sponsorship of the Bill must be seen as a sop--a peace offer-
ing-to Anti-Federalists; and many in the First Congress were relatively 
uninterested in the Bill, finding it a 'nauseous' distraction."87 
80. AMAR, supra note 8, at xiii. 
81. /d. at 133. 
82. /d. at 127. 
83. /d. at 82. 
84. /d. at xii. 
85. ld. at 159; see also id. at 68 ("[T]he agency problem [was] of protecting the people gen-
erally from self-interested government policy .... "). 
86. /d. at 159--60. 
87. ld. at 289. See also id. at 302 (''The Bill of Rights ... was initially an Anti-Federalist 
idea that moderate Federalists ultimately accepted and adjusted."). 
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Unlike the founding generation, the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment sought principally to safeguard minorities and individual liberties. 
Thus the Fourteenth Amendment "seems more liberal and individualistic, 
sounding mainly in civil rights, in the private liberty of the moderns."88 
Amar sums up the argument of The Bill of Rights in the following passage: 
[T]he 1789 Bill tightly knit together citizens' rights and states' rights; but 
the 1866 amendment unraveled this fabric, vesting citizens with rights 
against states. The original Bill also focused centrally on empowering the 
people collectively against government agents following their own agenda. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, focused on protecting minorities 
against even responsive, representative, majoritarian government. Over and 
over, the 1789 Bill proclaimed "the right[s]" and "the powers" of "the peo-
ple"-phrases conjuring up civic republicanism, collective political action, 
public rights, and positive liberty. The complementary phrase in the 1866 
amendment-"privileges or immunities of citizens"-indicates a subtle but 
real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision more liberal than republican, 
more individualistic than collectivist, more private than public, more nega-
tive than positive. 89 
The proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment thus transformed the meaning 
of the underlying document as they incorporated protections against the 
states. 
In analyzing textualism, this Article is not concerned with the latter half 
of Amar's book treating the Reconstruction amendments. Amar argues that 
the text of the Constitution as it existed before those amendments should be 
read differently because of the later amendments. For example, according to 
Amar, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment alters the way in which 
we should read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.90 Amar's 
conception that the Constitution as a whole must be reinterpreted as new 
amendments are adopted is not idiosyncratic,91 but neither is it representative 
of the approach of other textualists, and it will not be treated here. Equally 
important, this Article is limited to the issue of whether modern textualism 
captures the original meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I 
am not concerned with the way in which later generations understood the 
Constitution and its amendments.92 
One final question must be addressed before examining the historical va-
lidity of Amar's textualism: does Amar believe that his readings recapture 
original meaning? Like Justice Scalia and other textualists, Amar does make 
88. /d. at 133. 
89. /d. at 215-16. 
90. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 282-83; see also Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 
772-73 ("[A]fter the ratification of [the Fourteenth Amendment], equal protection should also be 
seen as implicit in the Fifth Amendment phrase 'due process of law.'"). 
91. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment Sex Equality, Fed-
eralism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002). 
92. For a jurisprudential (rather than historical) critique of Amar's use of textualism to fuse 
constitutional text enacted during different periods, see Vermeule & Young, supra note 67. 
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this claim. Thus in the introduction to The Bill of Rights, he announces that 
he is "offering an integrated overview of the Bill of Rights as originally 
conceived,"93 and he repeatedly asserts he is recapturing original meaning.94 
Similarly, The Document and the Doctrine asserts that his aim is "to under-
stand what the American people meant and did when We ratified and 
amended the document."95 
Nonetheless, in Intratextualism Amar suggests, perhaps as a fall-back 
position, that it does not matter whether his interpretive techniques produce 
readings that were "specifically intended"96: "[T]he pattern that we discern 
upon reflection may not have been specifically intended, but is still far from 
random."97 He compares the Constitution to a literary work: "A great play 
may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly in the play-
wright's mind when the muse came .... So too with the Constitution."98 
This assertion is striking. It reflects the gap between Amar's methodol-
ogy of recovering original meaning and the reality of the way in which 
constitutional documents are understood at the time of their creation. By 
ignoring drafting history and treating the Constitution as emanating from the 
American people in the same way that a work of art comes from its author, 
Amar overlooks the extent to which the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
were shaped by the decisions of particular historical actors. 
Although the analytic flaws of Amar's approach as applied to the una-
mended Constitution are beyond the scope of this Article, the gap between 
Amar's conception of a document springing full blown from the brow of the 
American people and the reality of a document drafted by particular histori-
cal actors is important and should be noted. Two individuals played critical 
roles in forming the Constitution. James Madison was principally responsi-
ble for the Virginia Plan, the plan of government introduced at the start of 
the Philadelphia convention.99 As historian Clinton Rossiter has observed, 
"[e]laborated, tightened, amended, and refined under three months of un-
ceasing pressure-much of which Madison resented at the time-the 
93. AMAR, supra note 8, at xii (emphasis added). 
94. The Introduction and the first chapter include multiple other examples. ld. at xiii ("[T]his 
first issue was indeed first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights."); id. at 8 ("[T]he 
words that we refer to as the First Amendment really weren't 'first' in the minds of the First Con-
gress."); id. at 14 ("[l]t is not surprising that the First Congress's First Amendment attempted further 
fine tuning of the structure of representation in the lower house."); id. at 18 ("[B]oth amendments 
were attempts to strengthen majoritarianism rather than check it, for both sought to tighten the link 
between representatives and their constituents .... "). 
95. Amar, supra note I, at 29; see also id. at 27 ("What the American People have said and 
done in the Constitution is often more edifying, inspiring, and sensible than what the Justices have 
said and done in the case law."); id. at 29 ("By pondering the public legislative history of these care-
fully chosen words, we can often learn more about what they meant to the American People who 
enacted them as the supreme law of the land."). 
96. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 793. 
97. ld. 
98. ld. at 793-94. 
99. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:THEGRANDCONVENTION 161 (1966). 
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Virginia Plan became the Constitution of the United States." 100 At the other 
end of the process, Gouverneur Morris was given responsibility by the 
Committee on Style for taking the various proposals and votes and putting 
them into a final polished document. The Constitution, Morris subsequently 
boasted in a letter to Timothy Pickering, "was written by the fingers which 
write this letter." 101 In a letter he authored at the end of his life, Madison ac-
knowledged Morris's role: "The finish ... fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. 
Morris .... '[A] better choice' ... 'could not have been made.' ... It is true 
that the state of the materials . . . was a good preparation ... but there was 
sufficient room for the talents and taste stamped by the author on the face of 
it." 102 
The Bill of Rights, like the Constitution, did not emerge whole cloth 
from "the People" but rather was drafted. In this case, there was only one 
principal author-James Madison. Madison's initial proposal was modified 
in a number of ways by the House and then the Senate, but the language 
remained largely his. 103 
As a result, if one seeks deep and unintended meanings in the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights in the same way that a literary critic might seek 
them in a play, one is largely plumbing the minds of Madison and Morris. I 
do not know of any theory of constitutional interpretation under which the 
personal, unconscious views of the drafter are an appropriate basis for legal 
interpretation. (Amar certainly does not offer a justification for such a view.) 
Moreover, Madison and Morris are not the most representative thinkers of 
their era, so their unconscious thoughts are hardly a good stand-in for the 
unconscious thoughts of the American people. Finally, to the extent that 
there are hidden meanings in the Constitution, questions about Morris's fair-
mindedness as a drafter make giving legal effect to those meanings particu-
larly problematic. There has been ongoing debate among scholars about 
whether Morris fairly synthesized the work of the Convention. 104 At the time 
I 00. /d. 
10 I. /d. at 225. 
102. ld. 
103. See infra Parts II-III; see a/so CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DocUMENTARY 
RECORD FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS xiv-xvi (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter DocUMEN-
TARY RECORD). 
104. In addition to the Territories Clause, scholars have focused on the Committee of Style's 
use of a semicolon before the start of the General Welfare Clause. When initially approved by the 
convention, the clause was preceded by a comma. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 493, 569 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter REcoRDS]. When it emerged from 
the Committee on Style, the clause was preceded by a semicolon, id. at 594, arguably making it a 
general grant of power rather than a limitation on the taxing power. On the floor of the convention, 
no one objected to (or even mentioned) the punctuation change. When the Constitution was again 
printed, the semicolon had again become a comma. ld. at 655. For the allegation that Morris added 
the punctuation in bad faith and the claim that Roger Sherman corrected the punctuation before the 
Constitution was engrossed, see 3 RECORDS, supra, at 379 (presenting the statement of Albert 
Gallatin). Academic discussion of the Committee of Style's punctuation of the General Welfare 
Clause takes different positions on Morris's culpability. Compare MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 182 (1913) ("The change may or may not have been 
intentional .... "), and FORREST McDoNALD, Novus 0ROO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
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of the Louisiana Purchase, Morris himself suggested that he crafted the Ter-
ritories Clause with the hidden purpose of ensuring that newly acquired 
territories could not become states. 105 Questions about Morris's scrupulous-
ness are a factor weighing against reading subtleties into the document that 
a reasonable reader at the time would not have grasped. 
More fundamentally, an approach that reads meanings into the Constitu-
tion that were not specifically intended is an approach that has no claim to 
majoritarian sanction. It is not plausible to say that a particular reading of a 
text has majoritarian approval when it is a reading that people at the time of 
ratification would not have been aware of. To the extent that Amar justifies 
his readings on this ground, they lack the claim to democratic legitimacy 
that is one of textualism's most compelling features. 
The critical question concerning Professor Amar's textualism remains 
whether it accurately captures original meaning. The next Part begins the 
exploration of this topic by examining his analysis of the Ninth Amendment. 
II. THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
The original meaning of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments for Professor 
Amar may be gleaned from the title of the relevant chapter in The Bill of 
Rights: "The Popular Sovereignty Amendments." 106 The Ninth Amendment 
was "a federalism clause intertwined with the Tenth Amendment," and it 
"began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the people." 107 
While Amar's point that collective rights were part of the Ninth Amend-
ment's "rights ... retained by the people" is legitimate, his basic thesis that 
the amendment "began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the 
people" is wrong because it denies that the amendment was fundamentally 
concerned with the protection of individual rights. 
Amar's account of the Ninth Amendment is deeply flawed in part be-
cause, employing his textualist approach, he assumes that location is a 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 265 (1985) ("Morris made a clever attempt ... .''), with ROSSITER, 
supra note 99, at 228-29 ("[Morris] was a faithful servant of the committee and the committee of 
the Convention.''), and David Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
215, 252-53 (1995) (describing Morris's misbehavior as a "myth"). Despite his position that inter· 
pretive weight should be given to underlying meanings that "The People" did not specifically intend, 
see supra text accompanying notes 95-97, Professor Amaris aware of the claims that Morris inten-
tionally attempted to alter the punctuation of the general welfare clause to alter its meaning. See 
Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 
n.25 (1987) ("Professor Farrand offers a fascinating account of a clause in which an apparently 
small change in punctuation was attempted in order to effect a large change in meaning.") 
105. He wrote: 
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would proper to gov-
ern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of 
the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Can· 
dor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong 
opposition would have been made. 
3 RECORDS, supra note 103, at 404. For discussion, see McDONALD, supra note I 04, at 282-83. 
106. AMAR, supra note 8, at 119. 
107. /d. at 280. 
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powerful guide to meaning and that meaning can be deduced from looking 
at the finished document rather than from probing drafting history. He as-
signs great weight to the fact that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next 
to each other. But this was a coincidence. When Madison proposed his 
amendments, he wanted them inserted into the constitutional document, not 
added to the end. And the predecessors of the Ninth and the Tenth Amend-
ment were at very different places on his list of amendments. They 
eventually wound up together because of a series of legislative decisions 
having nothing to do with a sense they were linked. 
While a modem reader such as Amar might naturally interpret "rights" 
of "the people" as reflecting principally collective rights rather than the in-
dividual's rights-rights that "the people" rather than the individual could 
assert against the government-eighteenth-century usage was not so limited. 
The term "rights of the people" was used to encompass individual rights. 
While Amar bolsters his textual account by drawing on some historical 
evidence concerning the demand for protection of the popular right to 
change governments, he ignores evidence of the demand for protection of 
individual rights, a demand that was at least as strongly pressed. 108 
A. Amar's Thesis 
Amar bitingly observes that "[t]o see the Ninth Amendment, as origi-
nally written, as a palladium of countermajoritarian individual rights-like 
privacy-is to engage in anachronism." 109 His argument is based in part on 
his literal reading of the text. He understands the Ninth Amendment's 
"rights ... retained by the people" to mean rights the people collectively 
retain rather than individual rights: it is about the rights of the people, not 
the rights of the person. The "core meaning" of the phrase "the people" in 
the Ninth Amendment is "conspicuously collective"110: 
[T]he most obvious and inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment 
is the collective right of We the People to alter or abolish government, 
through the distinctly American device of the constitutional convention. 
We have already seen that this clarifying gloss-with antecedents in virtu-
ally every state constitution-was initially proposed as a prefix to the 
Preamble, only to be dropped for stylistic reasons and resurrected in the 
First Amendment's explicit right of "the people" to assemble in conven-
tion.111 
Amar also appeals to "[t]he legislative history of [the Ninth and Tenth] 
amendments[, which] confirms their close interrelations with each other and 
108. For a helpful discussion of the literature on the Ninth Amendment and a defense of the 
view that the Amendment protected individual rights as well as a narrow construction of the powers 
of the national government, see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 
TEx. L. REV. I (2006). 
109. AMAR, supra note 8, at 120. 
110. /d. 
Ill. /d. 
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with the Preamble, and their obvious implications for the people's right to 
alter or abolish." 112 He argues that the discussion of such principles at the 
ratifying conventions of Virginia and New York is relevant to an understand-
ing of the Ninth Amendment. Virginia declared at her convention that "the 
powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the 
United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be per-
verted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted 
thereby remains with them, at their will .... " 113 New York similarly re-
quested an amendment ensuring the following: 
[T]he powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever 
it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the 
Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government 
thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or to their respective 
state governments, to whom they may have granted the same .... 114 
Amar further observes that both the Declaration of Independence and 
Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 recognized the right to alter or abolish gov-
ernment. He concludes that "[t]he rights of 'the people' affirmed in the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments may well mean more than the right to alter or 
abolish, but surely they mean at least this much at their core."115 
He finds that placement and word choice reinforce this view: 
[C]onventional wisdom today misses the close triangular interrelation 
among the Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments .... [L]ook 
again at these texts. All are at their core about popular sovereignty. All, in-
deed, explicitly invoke "the people." . . . If the Ninth is mainly about 
individual rights, why does it not speak of individual "persons" rather than 
the collective "the people"? If the Tenth is only about states' rights, why 
does it stand back-to-hack with the Ninth, and what are its last three words 
doing there, mirroring the Preamble's first three? 116 
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Amar proclaims, are "ringing affirma-
. f I . ,111 tlons o popu ar sovereignty. 
The Ninth Amendment is also about federalism, and Amar again draws 
on placement and word choice to construct his argument: 
[O]n a federalism-based reading, the Ninth and Tenth fit together snugly, 
as their words and their legislative history make clear; but each amendment 
complements the other without duplicating it. The Tenth says that Con-
gress must point to some explicit or implicit enumerated power before it 
112. ld. at 121. 
113. /d. (quoting I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 327 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury 
1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES]). 
114. /d. at 122 (quoting I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note I 13, at 327). 
115. /d. 
116. /d. at 121. 
117. /d. at 124. 
December 2007] Taking Text too Seriously 
can act; and the Ninth addresses the closely related but distinct question of 
whether such express or implied enumerated power in fact exists. 118 
511 
Amar adds that "the federalism roots of the Ninth Amendment, and its links 
to the unique enumerated-power strategy of Article I, help explain why no 
previous state constitution featured language precisely like the Ninth's-a 
fact conveniently ignored by most mainstream accounts." 119 In short, the 
Ninth Amendment-in addition to protecting group rights-means that a 
right's presence in the Bill of Rights does not mean there is necessarily a 
federal power to adopt legislation abridging that right. 120 
Individual rights are absent from Amar's account of the Ninth Amend-
ment. When he observes that the "core meaning [of] the Ninth 
[Amendment] is ... collective,"121 he may be leaving open the possibility 
that there is protection of individual rights at the Amendment's periphery, 
but that is as close as he comes to recognizing that the amendment was in-
tended to afford any protection for individual rights. 
B. Critique: Legislative History in the States 
Amar's account of the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment in the 
states focuses on state proposals for an amendment that would recognize the 
people's right to alter or abolish government. He omits the evidence from 
state ratifying conventions that supports the view that the Ninth Amendment 
was concerned with protection of unenumerated individual rights. As a re-
sult, he acknowledges only a part of the states' concerns. Equally 
significant, his account fails to recognize usages that indicate "rights" of the 
"people" encompassed individual rights. 
As noted, Amar discusses the ratification history of Virginia and New 
York. He quotes the resolution of the Virginia ratifying convention concerning 
the right of "people of the United States" to retake "the powers granted un-
der the Constitution . . . whensoever the same shall be perverted to their 
injury or oppression." 122 But he does not discuss the opening lines of 
Virginia's resolution: 
That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from 
encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some 
such manner as the following: 
FIRST, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form 
a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing 
118. /d. at 123-24. 
119. /d.at124. 
120. /d. 
121. See id. at 120. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety. 12) 
Virginia's resolution thus opens with a request for an amendment recog-
nizing "natural rights." These natural rights are principally, if not wholly, 
rights of the individual, not the group. While "liberty" could be private or pub-
lic, it is clear the right to the "enjoyment of life" was individual. Similarly, the 
Virginia ratifying convention focused on an individual right to protect "the 
means for acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." Finally, although 
there is much debate on what the phrase "pursuit of happiness" meant to the 
founding generation-and in particular what Jefferson meant in using the 
phrase in the Declaration of Independence-this is likewise a right of the in-
dividual, as historian Ronald Hamowy has suggested: 
When Jefferson spoke [in the Declaration of Independence] of an inalien-
able right to the pursuit of happiness, he meant that men may act as they 
choose in their search for ease, comfort, felicity, and grace, either by own-
ing property or not, by accumulating wealth or distributing it, by opting for 
material success or asceticism, in a word, by determining the path to their 
own earthly and heavenly salvation as they alone see fit. 124 
The right to pursue happiness, in short, is the individual's right to pursue 
personal happiness. 
The delegates at Virginia's ratifying convention put these individual 
rights on a list of "the essential and unalienable Rights of the People."125 A 
number of the rights that follow on that list are described as rights of a 
"man," the "freeman," or the "person." This group includes civil and crimi-
nal procedure rights, the right of a conscientious objector not to serve in the 
military, and the precursor to the Fourth Amendment. 126 The terms "man," 
"freeman," and "person" indicate that those rights were viewed as individual 
rights, a point Amar makes elsewhere in his book.127 Thus a close analysis of 
Virginia's proposals shows that the phrase "Rights of the People" encom-
passed a series of individual rights, directly undercutting Amar's assertion 
that "the people" in the Ninth Amendment indicates that the core meaning 
of the amendment is collective. 128 
New York-the other state whose ratification history Amar invokes-
also proposed a series of constitutional amendments sounding in natural 
rights, although it is omitted from Amar's account. Its second proposed 
123. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in DocuMENTARY 
RECORD, supra note 103, at 17, 17. 
124. Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's 
Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503, 519 ( 1979). 
125. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17. 
126. /d. at 17-19. 
127. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 64--65. 
128. See id. at 120. Virginia's list included collective rights (such as the right of resistance to 
arbitrary government) and individual rights. See Amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention, 
supra note 123, at 17. My point is not that collective rights were not considered rights of the people; 
rather, it is that, contrary to Amar, they were not the core rights to the exclusion of individual rights. 
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amendment reads as follows: "That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to 
respect and preserve."129 While New York omitted the property right em-
braced by Virginia, by demanding protection for the "essential rights" to 
"the enjoyment of Life ... and the Pursuit of Happiness" (and perhaps by its 
reference to the enjoyment of liberty), the state ratifying convention was 
seeking protection of individual rights. 
New York also requested an amendment in which the individual right to 
conscience was formulated as a "right" of the "People."130 As in Virginia, the 
New York ratifying convention considered an individual right to be a "right" 
of the "People."131 
Amar's description of the "legislative history" 132 of the Ninth Amend-
ment gives a misleading picture of the proposals made at state ratifying 
conventions. He looks solely at the two conventions that invoked the peo-
ple's right to alter or abolish government-New York and Virginia-and 
fails to discuss those states' proposed amendments regarding the natural 
right to pursue life, liberty, and happiness (which, in the case of Virginia, 
specifically recognized a property right). He does not acknowledge that the 
proposed amendments reflected the usage under which individual rights 
were rights of the people. But the evidence indicates that individual rights 
were at least as much the subject of the Ninth Amendment as the collective 
rights that are the sole focus of Amar's analysis. 
129. Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in DocuMENTARY 
RECORD, supra note 103, at 21, 21. 
130. /d. at 22 ("That the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and 
peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience .... "). 
131. In his account of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Amar also does not mention North 
Carolina's proposals, but North Carolina's First Amendment similarly called for recognition of 
natural rights. Its language followed Virginia's: "That there are certain natural rights, of which men, 
when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." North Carolina Convention Debates ( 1788}, re-
printed in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocUMENTARY HISTORY 933, 966 
(1971) [hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY). Willie Jones, the delegate who proposed the Declara-
tion of Rights, acknowledged that "I have, in my proposition, adopted, word for word, the Virginia 
amendments, with one or two additional ones." 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 933. The North 
Carolina ratifying convention did not ratify (or reject) the federal Constitution; it instead proposed 
amendments previous to ratification. The state ratified the federal Constitution after the Bill of 
Rights was adopted. See id. at 932-33. North Carolina did not copy the Virginia language that Amar 
relies on concerning the people of the United States' right to resume powers granted under the Con-
stitution. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 121-22. See supra text accompanying note 114. The language 
from Virginia that Amar quotes is not language from a proposed amendment. It is, rather, language 
from the state's ratification transmittal letter. See 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra,. at 121-22, & 
348 n.6 (quoting Virginia Resolution (June 26, 1788}, reprinted in I ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 
113, at 327). Nonetheless, Virginia had a proposal that went to the same basic point, declaring that 
the "doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd slavish." Amend-
ments Proposed by Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17. North Carolina followed this 
proposal. See North Carolina Convention Debates, supra, at 966-67. 
132. AMAR, supra note 8, at 119-22. 
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C. Critique: Legislative History in Congress 
Examination of the Ninth Amendment's legislative history in Congress 
underscores the problem with Amar's approach. It provides additional evi-
dence that "rights" of the "people" included individual rights at least as 
much as collective rights. Even more dramatically, it shows that the conclu-
sions Amar draws from the placement of the Ninth Amendment are wholly 
mistaken. 
When Madison initially proposed his amendments to the Constitution, 
he intended that they would be inserted into the Constitution, and his pro-
posal identified precisely where. 133 What I will call Madison's Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments, the precursors of our Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
were to be inserted into the Constitution at different places. Rather than 
placing them next to each other, Madison would have situated them at al-
most opposite ends of the document. 
Madison's Tenth Amendment was part of his eighth proposal. It was to 
be part of a proposed new Article VII, where it would have been combined 
with a separation-of-powers provision to form the penultimate article of the 
Constitution. 134 (The current Article VII, which provides that the Constitu-
tion shall go into effect when ratified by nine states, would have become 
Article VIII.) 135 Placed almost at the end of the document, the separation-of-
powers provision and the Tenth Amendment would have provided an inter-
pretive gloss on the document as a whole. 
In contrast, Madison's Ninth Amendment was part of his fourth pro-
posal. It was the final provision in a series of ten provisions that he sought to 
insert in Article I, Section 9 between Clause 3 and Clause 4. 136 The place-
ment of these provisions suggests their object and their purpose: they 
pertained to Congress and thus were to be added to Article I; they were limi-
tations on congressional power and thus were to be added to Section 9 of 
Article I. Specifically, they protected rights against congressional interfer-
ence and thus immediately followed the two clauses of the unamended 
Constitution that protect rights against congressional infringement-the 
Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post 
Facto Clause.137 
When viewed in relation to the amendments that preceded them in 
Madison's proposal, Madison's Ninth Amendment clearly protected indi-
vidual as well as group rights: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of par-
ticular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance 
of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated 
133. See Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in DocUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 
11,11-14. 
134. See id. at 13-14. 
135. /d. at 14. 
136. See id. at 12-13. 
137. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cis. 2-3. 
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by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as 
inserted merely for greater caution.m 
515 
The amendment thus directly glossed the preceding provisions that were 
already in, or were to be inserted in, Article I. Some of those provisions 
were unambiguously concerned with individual (as opposed to collective) 
rights. For example, the immediately preceding provision was the precursor 
to our Sixth Amendment. Even in Amar's account, in "the clustered rights of 
confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel ... we see a genuine affir-
mation of rights of the accused and only the accused, rights of a single 
person standing alone against the world."139 Madison's Ninth Amendment 
would have referred back to the individual rights protected in the Suspen-
sion of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the unamended Constitution. So these individual rights are, in the 
language of Madison's Ninth Amendment, "rights retained by the people."140 
Their enumeration does not "diminish the just importance of other rights 
retained by the people."141 
While Amar indicates that individual rights were at the periphery of the 
Ninth Amendment, if they were there at all, it is clear that Madison consid-
ered individual rights fully encompassed in the "rights" of the Ninth 
Amendment. Other statements by Madison provide further evidence that he 
believed that the rights of the "people" included individual rights. His pro-
posal concerning free speech directly referred to individual rights as rights 
of the "people": ''The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right 
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments .... " 142 His statement con-
cerning his ultimately unsuccessful amendment limiting the power of the 
states is to the same effect. Madison would have added to the Constitution 
the following provision: "No state shall violate the equal rights of con-
science, of the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."143 
In defending this proposal on the House floor, Madison referred to these 
138. Madison Resolution, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1789, in DocUMENTARY RECORD, 
supra note 103, at II, 13. 
139. AMAR, supra note 8, at 114. 
140. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. Madison's floor statement on his Ninth 
Amendment also makes clear that it was a gloss on the rights provisions that would have preceded 
it: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to 
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; 
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended 
to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. 
This is one of the most plausible arguments that I have ever heard urged against the admission 
of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have at-
tempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution [the Ninth 
Amendment]. 
I ANNALS OF CoNG. col. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
141. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. 
142. /d. at 12. 
143. /d. at 13. 
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three rights as "rights of the community." 144 Even if one were to follow Amar 
and put the accent on the community in understanding the freedom of the 
press and the right of trial by jury, 145 it is clear that the right of conscience, 
an individual right, is for Madison a "right[] of the community." 
While sparse, the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment buttresses 
the conclusion that the Amendment was understood to encompass individual 
rights. Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman was the main proponent of the 
view that amendments should appear at the end of the Constitution rather than 
be interwoven throughout the original text. He apparently made a proposal to 
the House Select Committee demonstrating how Madison's proposals could 
be revised and put at the end of the Constitution. 146 Madison's Ninth Amend-
ment was folded in with other rights to become Sherman's Second 
Amendment: 
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when 
they enter into society, Such are the rights of conscience in matters of re-
ligion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness & safety; of 
Speaking, writing, and publishing their Sentiments with decency and free-
dom; of peaceably Assembling to consult their common good, and of 
applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of griev-
ances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the 
government of the united States. 147 
Thus among the "rights" that the "people" "retain[]" are individual rights 
such as the right of conscience and of property. 
Professor Amar's account does not analyze the legislative history of the 
Ninth Amendment, but there is nothing there to suggest a repudiation of the 
view shared by Madison and Sherman that the rights of the people included 
individual rights. The significant changes in text from Madison's version of 
the Ninth Amendment to the current version occurred in the House Select 
Committee, and we have no record of its debates. The Committee edited the 
proposal down to the first clause and tightened the text. The beginning of 
Madison's proposal-"[t]he exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitu-
tion, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to 
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people"148-was 
modified to become the entire proposal: ''The enumeration in this Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people."149 There is nothing in the shift to suggest that indi-
vidual rights were now omitted from the "rights retained by the people." 
144. CONG. REG., June 8, 1789, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 69, 
85. 
145. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 20--26, 81-118. 
146. Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789) in DocUMENTARY 
RECORD, supra note I 03, at 266, 268 n. 
147. /d. at 267. 
148. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. 
149. House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 
29, 31. 
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In addition to changing the text of Madison's Ninth Amendment, the 
committee also slightly modified its location, although this change did not 
alter its meaning either. Rather than appearing in Article I, Section 9 after 
the Suspension of Habeas Clause and Bill of Attainder-Ex Post Facto 
Clause, the various rights provisions (culminating with what became our 
Ninth Amendment) were inserted between the two clauses. 150 The committee 
changed neither the text of Madison's Tenth Amendment nor its location: it 
continued to be situated alongside the separation-of-powers provision in 
what was intended to become a new Article VII. 151 
After the work of the Select Committee was completed, Sherman pro-
posed that the amendments should be added to the end of the original 
Constitution rather interwoven within it. He argued this was more consistent 
with the practice for statutes. He also reasoned that the amendments should 
be presented separately because they were to be adopted by the states, 
whereas the Constitution had been adopted by the people.152 Madison voiced 
a slight preference for his original plan on the grounds of form-"there is a 
neatness and propriety in incorporating the amendments into the constitu-
tion itself' 153-but Sherman's proposal prevailed. 
When the House decided the amendments should be appended to the 
end of the Constitution, it also reordered them in a way that had the conse-
quence of moving what was to become the Ninth Amendment. In Madison's 
proposal, the amendment constraining states-"No state shall violate the 
equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in 
criminal cases"154-was to be inserted into Article I, Section 10 beside the 
preexisting limitations on state powers, and two amendments that were prin-
cipally concerned with jury-trial rights were to be inserted into Article III. 155 
The House decided to bring all these rights provisions together. What be-
came the Ninth Amendment was pushed back, apparently so that it could 
gloss all these rights provisions: both those that Madison would have in-
serted in Article I, Section 10 and Article III and those with which 
Madison's Ninth Amendment had originally been linked. The future Ninth 
Amendment became Article Fifteen. 156 The House's Bill of Rights then 
closed with the two provisions that had closed Madison's proposal: the sepa-
ration-of-powers amendment (Article Sixteen) and our Tenth Amendment 
(Article Seventeen).157 Presumably these last two provisions were still 
150. /d. at 30. 
151. Seeid.at32-33. 
152. See CONG. REG. (Aug. 13, 1789) (quoting Roger Sherman), in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 
supra note 103, at 112, 117-18, 125-26. 
153. /d. at 112, 118 (quoting James Madison). 
154. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. 
155. See id. 
156. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (August 24, 1789), in DocuMENTARY 
RECORD, supra note 103, at 37, 41. 
157. See id. 
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intended to be read as Madison had intended they be read-as a unit to 
guide the interpretation of the Constitution as a whole. 
Among the proposals in the House version that the Senate rejected was 
Article Sixteen, the separation-of-powers provision. And so as the Bill of 
Rights emerged from the Senate, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments ap-
peared next to each other for the first time as the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Amendments. 158 Thus joined, they were submitted to the States and eventu-
ally amended to the Constitution. 
Professor Amar is wrong to assign significance to their proximity. The 
history of their evolution indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
were not intended to be understood as a unit and that no one conceived of 
them as belonging together. The ratification history in the states and the 
Ninth Amendment's legislative history further vitiate Amar's claim. The 
Ninth Amendment's "rights" of "the people" were individual rights, not 
fundamentally collective ones. 
III. THE FLAWS OF HOLISTIC TEXTUALISM 
This Part builds on Part II's discussion of the Ninth Amendment to show 
how the flaws of Amar's approach to the Ninth Amendment illustrate the 
larger problems with Amar's analysis of the Bill of Rights. More broadly, 
this Part shows why close-reading textualism is a poor guide to original 
meaning. 
The basic tenet of intratextualism is that, through the repetition of words 
and phrases, constitutional clauses gloss each other and reveal underlying 
meaning. 159 Professor Amar, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas practice this 
method of interpretation.160 Section liLA refutes Amar's exegesis of the con-
cept of the "rights" of the "people." Amar's tight focus on the way words are 
used in the Constitution (without adequate consideration of uses outside the 
Constitution), combined with his strong presumption that the meaning of 
words is constant throughout the document, leads to a misconception of the 
original understanding. Intratextualism artificially cuts off relevant evidence, 
emphasizing usages that appear in the document while deemphasizing other, 
equally valid contemporaneous usages. 
Holistic textualism insists that the location of clauses in the Constitution 
reveals meaning. Building on the prior discussion of the Ninth Amendment, 
Section III.B shows that the reason for the final placement of a clause is 
often unclear. Amar's interpretive technique leads to serious errors. The 
founders did not attach great significance to the location of clauses within 
either the Bill of Rights or the unamended Constitution. 
Finally, Amar argues that "[p ]erhaps the greatest virtue of intratextual-
ism is this: it takes seriously the document as a whole rather than as a 
158. See Articles of Amendment, as Agreed to by the Senate (Sept. 14, 1789), in DocUMEN-
TARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 47, 49. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 62-73. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. 
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jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses."161 Perhaps because Amar (correctly) 
sees republican elements in the Bill of Rights, this approach leads him to a 
conception of the Bill of Rights as "largely republican and collective, sound-
ing mainly in political rights, in the public liberty of the ancients."162 But 
Section III.C shows that Amar's analysis is at odds with historical reality. 
Holistic textualism assumes a degree of ideological coherence that the Bill 
of Rights lacks, and Amar stresses collective rights in a way that is inconsis-
tent with the original understanding. 
A. Intratextualism 
The terms at the heart of Amar's analysis of the Bill of Rights are ''the 
people" and, more broadly, "the rights of the people": "The phrase the peo-
ple appears in no fewer than five of the ten amendments that make up our 
Bill of Rights," 163 he observes at one point; "I hope it has not escaped our 
notice that no phrase appears in more of the first ten amendments than 'the 
people,' "164 he reminds us at another. Amar declares that "the grand idea of 
the original Bill of Rights [is] the rights of the people .... " 165 
In analyzing the various uses of "the people" in the Bill of Rights, Amar 
employs a mode of analysis that calls to mind dominoes. In the beginning, 
literally and analytically, there is the "We the People" of the Preamble, 
which guides the interpretation of the First Amendment's "right of the 
people peaceably to assemble."166 "The right of the people to assemble does 
not simply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet 
together; it is also an express reservation of the collective right of We the 
People to assemble in a future convention and exercise our sovereign right 
to alter or abolish our govemment,"167 Amar argues: "[O]ur First 
Amendment's language of 'the right of the people to assemble' simply made 
explicit at the end of the Constitution what [Virginia's Edmund] Pendleton 
and others already saw implicit in its opening."168 
Next there is the First Amendment's "ri~ht to petition," which is textu-
ally interwoven with the right to assemble. 1 Amar rejects the position that 
the right to petition is at its heart a civil right protecting the individual's 
right to petition: ''The language and structure of our First Amendment 
161. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 795. 
162. AMAR, supra note 8, at 133. 
163. ld. at 112. 
164. /d. at 133. 
165. ld. 
166. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
167. AMAR, supra note 8, at 26. 
168. /d. at 28. 
169. The First Amendment recognizes "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
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suggest otherwise. As with assembly, the core petition right is collective and 
popular-it, too, is a right of the people."170 
The interpretation given to the two provisions of the First Amendment 
concerning the "right of the people" then guides the construction of the 
phrase in the Second Amendment: 
[T]he Second Amendment was closely linked to the textually adjoining 
First Amendment's guarantees of assembly and petition. One textual tip-
off is the use of the magisterial Preamble phrase "the people" in both con-
texts, thereby conjuring up the Constitution's grand principle of popular 
sovereignty and its concomitant popular right to alter or abolish the na-
tional government. 171 
Part II of this Article discussed how Amar makes similar arguments at 
the other end of the Bill of Rights, contending that "[t]he conspicuously 
collective meaning of 'the people' in the Tenth Amendment (and elsewhere) 
should alert us that its core meaning in the Ninth Amendment is similarly 
collective."172 All of these readings at the beginning and end of the Bill of 
Rights converge near the middle to shape the interpretation of "the right of 
the people" protected in the Fourth Amendment173: 
We have already noted that the First and Second Amendments' references 
to "the people" implied a core collective right, echoing the Preamble's 
commitment to the ultimate sovereignty of "We the People of the United 
States." So too with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments' use of that phrase 
174 
Amar recognizes there is textual evidence that weighs against finding "a 
core collective right" in the Fourth Amendment: "[l]n the Fourth Amend-
ment, as nowhere else in the Constitution, the collective-sounding phrase the 
people is immediately qualified by the use-twice-of the more individual-
istic language of persons."175 Nonetheless, Amar stresses the collective 
aspects of the amendment's protections (while recognizing that it also pro-
tects individual rights): "As with the First Amendment, the central role of 
the jury in the Fourth Amendment should remind us that the core rights of 
'the people' were popular and populist rights-rights that the popular body 
of the jury was well situated to vindicate."176 He concludes that "[a]s with 
170. AMAR, supra note 8, at 30. 
171. /d. at47. 
172. ld. at 120. 
173. The Fourth Amendment, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
174. AMAR, supra note 8, at 64. 
175. /d.at67. 
176. ld. at 73. 
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virtually every Bill of Rights provision thus far examined, the Fourth 
Amendment evinces at least as much concern with the agency problem of 
protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy as 
with protecting minorities against majorities of fellow citizens." 177 
This is an illustration of intratextualism at work. The various references 
to "the people" serve to gloss each other. Consistently interpreted, the six 
constitutional provisions come to represent a "core collective right." 178 More 
broadly, the Bill of Rights comes to embody a coherent vision consistent 
with Amar's view that the Constitution is a unified whole and that constitu-
tional interpreters must "take[] seriously the document as a whole rather 
than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses."179 
The problem with this approach was revealed in Part II's analysis of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. When members of the founding generation 
spoke of rights of the people, they may have been referring to collective 
rights (since the people possessed such rights), individual rights (since the 
people also possessed such rights), or both. Which type of rights the Bill of 
Rights protects is contextual. The fact that the "powers ... reserved to the 
... people" in the Tenth Amendment are not powers that an individual might 
possess does not mean that the "rights ... retained by the people" in the 
Ninth Amendment are at their core collective rights rather than individual 
rights. 
Amar's disregard of this point-his attempt to interpret all usages uni-
formly-leads him to readings that make no sense as history. He notes with 
respect to the Fourth Amendment, for example, that with the exception of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, in protecting against illegitimate 
search and seizures, all of the state constitutions described the right at stake 
as a right of a "freeman" or "man," thus indicating that it was an individual 
right. 180 Similarly, in seeking an amendment to the federal constitution, state 
ratifying conventions formulated the right as an individual right. 181 But 
Madison nonetheless opted to frame the Fourth Amendment as protecting a 
"right of the people." "Was Madison's use of the phrase 'the people' simply 
sloppy draftsmanship," Amar asks, "or is there a way of understanding the 
phrase as a collective noun even in the Fourth Amendment?" 182 Amar opts 
for the latter choice. 183 
Amar's question, however, focuses on two choices, silently excluding 
another possibility-that Madison referred to "[t]he right of the people" 
because an individual right could be a right of the people. Such an interpre-
tation would be consistent with Madison's commitment to individual liberty. 
177. /d. at 67-68. 
178. /d. at 64. 
179. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 795. 
180. AMAR, supra note 8, at 65. 
181. /d. 
182. !d. 
183. Seeid.at65-67. 
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Amar's account, in contrast, necessarily posits that Madison, despite a 
commitment to individual liberty that Amar repeatedly highlights, converted 
into a group right a right that virtually everyone-including the 
Anti-Federalist-influenced state ratifying conventions-formulated as an 
individual right. Amar offers no evidence as to why, when it came to the 
Fourth Amendment, Madison might have suddenly become more republican 
than virtually anyone else, and it is hard to surmise what that reason might 
be. 
Precisely the same point can be made with respect to the First Amend-
ment's right to petition. Amar notes that in proposing constitutional 
amendments, "each [state ratifying] convention described the right of peti-
tion in purely individualistic language-a right of 'every freeman,' 'every 
person,' or 'every man.' " 184 Nonetheless, Amar argues that the "language 
and structure of our First Amendment suggest ... [that] the core petition 
right is collective ... .''185 But this reading is not a plausible account of his-
tory. As with the Fourth Amendment, Madison formulated the right of 
petition as a right of "[t]he people."186 Again, Amar's reading requires 
Madison to have done something directly counter to both Madison's ideol-
ogy and the popular will. 
It is not that an interpreter has nothing to gain by comparing one use of a 
word or phrase in the Constitution with other uses of that word or phrase. This 
has been standard interpretive practice since at least Chief Justice Marshall's 
tenure, and it can certainly be instructive. But intratextualism seeks much 
more. According to Amar, the intratextualist treats the Constitution as "dic-
tionary"187 and "concordance."188 What this seems to mean, based on its 
application in The Bill of Rights, is that usages outside of the Constitution 
are accorded much less weight than those inside. As a result, Amar over-
looks what I highlighted in Part II on the Ninth Amendment: Madison's 
original proposal, Sherman's proposal, the proposed amendments, and the 
Virginia and New York ratifying conventions' proposed amendments all 
used the term "rights" of "the people" to include individual rights. A reader 
looking only at the text of the ratified Bill of Rights might, perhaps, plausi-
bly conclude that the rights of "the people" were principally collective 
rights, rather than individual rights. But this narrow understanding is belied 
by other contemporaneous sources. 
The intratextualist notion of constitution as "rulebook"189 "telling us to 
construe parallel commands in parallel fashion" 190 then tightens the circle of 
184. ld. at 30. 
185. /d. 
186. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 12 ("The people shall not be restrained ... from 
applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances."). 
187. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 791. 
188. /d. at 792. 
189. /d. at 795. 
190. /d. 
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references even further. The intratextualist starts with a tiny dictionary and 
concordance. Because the Constitution is a rulebook, there is a strong pre-
sumption that when she encounters words or phrases more than once, they 
will have the same meaning. In the case of the rights of the people, this rule 
leads to misreadings: the meaning of the phrase is not consistent throughout 
the Bill of Rights, and original meaning is at oddr with Amar's interpreta-
tion. 
How often intratextualism will lead to readings consistent with original 
understanding, and how often it will lead to readings at odds with original 
understanding, cannot be answered abstractly. But one might expect that 
"the rights" of "the people" would be a particularly strong example of 
Amar's approach. The term appears repeatedly in a short document, and 
Amar has lavished his ingenuity and attention on exploring the term as the 
key to explaining the original Bill of Rights. But I have tried to show how 
intratextualism-at least with respect to the First Amendment's right to peti-
tion, the Fourth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment-leads to readings 
that are at odds with original understanding and thus fails in its goal of re-
covering that understanding. Amar's own example, then, suggests that 
intratextualism is of limited value. It may be (as it long has been) a legiti-
mate, limited canon of construction. But it is too unreliable to merit 
inclusion on the standard list of methods for interpreting the Constitution. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas 
have repeatedly argued that the way a term or word is used in one part of the 
Constitution is evidence of what it means in another. Thus in Kelo v. City of 
New London, 191 Justice Thomas defines "public use" in the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause-"nor shall private property be taken for a public 
use" 192-by reference to the way in which "use" is employed in limiting 
states' ability to tax imports and exports-"the net Produce of all Duties and 
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the 
Treasury of the United States."193 In his dissent in Morrison v. Olson,194 
Justice Scalia contends that the way the word "inferior" is used in the vest-
ing clause of Article III-''The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish."195-illuminates the use of the 
word "inferior" in the Appointments Clause of Article 11-"[T]he Congress 
may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments."196 My study of Amar's treatment of the "rights" of the "people" 
shows that this approach-an instance of Amar's intratextualism-is highly 
191. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,509-10 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
192. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
193. /d. art. I, § I 0, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
194. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,719-20 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
195. U.S. CoNST. art. III,§ I (emphasis added). 
196. /d. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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problematic as a guide to original meaning because it privileges a small sub-
set of contemporaneous usages (those in the constitutional document) over 
the larger body of relevant contemporaneous usages. 
B. Location 
In his article on intratextualism, Amar argues for "squeez[ing] meaning 
from the Constitution's organization chart."197 This methodology plays a 
critical role in The Bill of Rights, but Amar offers no evidence indicating 
that the founders assigned such significance to location. This Article has 
shown how this approach leads him astray when interpreting the Ninth 
Amendment. 198 
This is not an isolated example. Amar repeatedly assumes that location 
is a key to meaning in a way belied by the drafting history. Consider his 
treatment of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. The clause protects 
private property against governmental seizure.199 Because it protects an indi-
vidual right to property so unambiguously, it represents the most obvious 
challenge to Amar's reading of the Bill of Rights as a republican document. 
Amar resEonds by maintaining that Madison "slip[ped] the takings clause 
through." 00 He did so "[i]n part by clever bundling, tying the clause to a va-
riety of other provisions that commanded more enthusiasm"201 : 
Madison no doubt knew that Article II of the then-recent Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787 had featured prototypes of the due-process and just-
compensation clauses side-by-side. Yet camouflage is not quite compatibil-
ity, and on close inspection the takings clause is the odd man out in the 
Fifth Amendment-an openly substantive requirement following a string 
of procedural rules. 202 
Professor Amar repeats the point toward the end of his book: "In 1789, 
Madison cleverly packaged [the takings] clause and thus slipped it past a 
Congress that was considerably less libertarian than he .... "20 
This is incorrect. The claim that Congress somehow overlooked the tak-
ings clause is not credible. The Bill of Rights is not so long a document that 
a clause would have gone unnoticed. Even more telling, Congress did not 
unthinkingly accept Madison's bundling of the clauses in the Fifth Amend-
ment: in fact, it altered it. It is that congressional rebundling that may make 
197. Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 797 n.l97. For discussion, see supra Section 
LA. 
198. See supra Section II.B. 
199. The specific language of the Clause follows: "[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
200. AMAR, supra note 8, at 77. 
20 I. /d. at 78. 
202. /d. 
203. /d. at 268. 
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it appear to a textualist like Amar, who disregards drafting history and fo-
cuses on the final product, that the Takings Clause is the "odd man out." 
When he proposed the Bill of Rights, Madison envisioned his amend-
ments incorporated into the constitutional text, not appended to the end. 204 
And he placed the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause in the same amendment. 
For clarity, I will refer to this as "Madison's Fifth Amendment." That 
amendment was to be one of the amendments placed in Article I, Section 9 
between Clause 3 and Clause 4. These amendments would have followed 
the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the original Constitution and, like them, were to limit the fc 205 powers o ongress. 
The relationship among Madison's Fifth Amendment provisions was 
sensible. He had separately grouped (in what ultimately became the Sixth 
Amendment) postindictment criminal-process rights. The first three clauses 
of Madison's Fifth Amendment held the remaining process rights.206 The 
placement of the Takings Clause-the fourth clause-next to the Due Proc-
ess Clause, rather than being "camouflage," was natural. The earliest state 
constitutions of 1776 and 1777 did not contain takings clauses. To the extent 
they placed limits on governmental control of property, those limits were 
found in law-of-the-land provisions, the forerunners of the Due Process 
Clause.207 Those provisions contained no substantive limitations, only proce-
dural: private property could not be taken unless authorized by the law of 
the land or the judgment of a jury. If such procedures were followed, the 
state's authority over private property was unlimited. Thus if the legislature 
enacted a statute authorizing the seizure of property without compensation, 
the clauses did not bar such seizure. 
The takings limitation was an additional restriction on legislative action, 
and it was appropriately linked with the due-process (or law-of-the-land) 
restriction that it supplemented. Taken as a unit, the two clauses mean the 
government can take private property only if it follows appropriate proce-
dures and if it pays compensation. That the Northwest Ordinance "had 
featured prototypes of the due-process and just-compensation clauses 
204. See supra Section II.C. 
205. See DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103 at 12. 
206. The placement of the Self-Incrimination Clause in what became the Fifth Amendment 
rather than in what became the Sixth Amendment reflects the fact that it was not simply a right of a 
defendant at his trial: it extended, for example, to witnesses. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT 
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 255 (1988). 
207. MD. CoNST. of 1776, art. XXI ("That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, 
or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the 
land."), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 1688 (Francis Newton Thorpe 
ed., 1909) (hereinafter ORGANIC LAWS]; see also N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 5 
ORGANIC LAWS, supra, at 2632; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 ORGANIC LAWS, su-
pra, at 2788. For a discussion, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding Of The 
Takings Clause And The Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 782, 789 & n.40 (1995). 
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side-by-side"208 was not happenstance.209 While Amar suggests that the pair-
ing of the two rights in the Northwest Ordinance was unique, it was not. The 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780--the only one of the original thirteen 
state constitutions to have a takings clause before 1789-also placed its due-
process and takings protections in the same article.210 Thus, linking due-
process and takings clauses was natural.211 
Another example of Amar's overemphasis on location is his treatment of 
the amendment that was the first on the list of the amendments passed by 
Congress and sent to the states. This amendment would have governed the 
number of representatives in Congress and would have required that there 
initially be one representative in Congress for every thirty thousand people. 
It looms large in Amar's analysis. He entitles his first chapter "First Things 
First" and begins his substantive discussion of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights by "considering two Rrovisions that are not part of our Bill of Rights, 
but were part of Madison's" 12: 
This would-be First Amendment obviously sounds primarily in structure 
.... Had this original First Amendment prevailed in the state-ratification 
process ... it would no doubt be much harder for twentieth-century citi-
zens and scholars to ignore the Bill of Rights' emphasis on structure, for 
the Bill would begin and end with structural provisions .... It is poetic that 
this amendment was first, for it responded to perhaps the single most im-
portant concern of the Anti-Federalists.m 
The Anti-Federalists attached great importance to this amendment, which 
Professor Amar emphasizes by showing that five of the six states proposing 
amendments sought one fixing a minimum size for the House of Represen-
tatives. "This proposal," he tells us, "was never placed lower than second on 
an ordinarily long list of desired amendments. Only one principle ever 
ranked higher-the idea of limited federal power that eventually made its 
way into our Tenth (their Twelfth) Amendment."214 
208. AMAR, supra note 8, at 78. 
209. The fourth sentence of Article II of the Ordinance reads as follows: 
No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the law 
of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to 
take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be 
made for the same. 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, I Stat. 50, 51 n.(a), art. II (1789), reprinted in I DocuMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 131, at 397,400. 
210. MASS. DEC. OF RIGHTS of 1780, art. X, reprinted in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 131, at 339,341-42. 
211. The Declaration of Rights in the Vermont Constitution of 1777 did not link the Takings 
Clause and its version of the Due Process clause. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I,§§ II, IX (takings 
and due process clauses), reprinted in I DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 131, at 319, 322-23. 
The point is not that the linkage was inevitable but that it was commonplace, as the structure of the 
Massachusetts Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance suggest. 
212. AMAR, supra note 8, at 8. 
213. /d. at 8-9. 
214. /d.atl4. 
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The legislative history, however, does not indicate that the founding 
generation thought Congress's First Amendment was a "first thing" that 
should be put "first." To begin, this was Madison's Second Amendment: 
Madison's First Amendment would have been a new preamble to the Consti-
tution. 215 Amar discusses (in part) the proposed amendment to the preamble 
later in the book, but it is not mentioned in the first chapter, where Madison's 
Second Amendment is referred to as Madison's First Amendment.216 
Madison's Second Amendment, which became Congress's First Amendment, 
appeared second on his list because his ordering tracked the location in the 
Constitution where the amendments were to be inserted. Thus Madison's Sec-
ond Amendment was to be inserted into Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, the 
clause governing the number of representatives and the states they were to 
represent (and regulating the power to collect direct taxes).217 It was the sec-
ond location in the Constitution (after the preamble) where Madison wanted 
the text amended, and so the new text to be inserted there appeared as his sec-
ond amendment. The House rejected Madison's amendment to the preamble, 
and it decided to append the amendments to the end of the Constitution.218 
Thus Madison's Second Amendment became Congress's First Amendment by 
a process that reflected neither a sense that it was preeminent nor that its 
placement was particularly significant. 
Nor does Amar offer any historical evidence to support his view that the 
order in which the states listed proposed amendments corresponded to their 
sense of the amendments' importance. 219 It should be noted that in proposing 
amendments, the states for the most part shared Madison's intent that they 
be inserted into the constitutional text. 220 As Congressman Benson observed 
in arguing for Madison's plan to incorporate the amendments into the text, 
Madison's "decision was founded in a great degree upon the recommenda-
tion of the state conventions, who had proposed amendments in this very 
form."221 Given that Madison proposed his amendments in order of where 
they should go in the constitutional text, one might suspect that this is also 
what the states did. This would suggest that the amendment concerning rep-
resentation "was never placed lower than second on an ordinarily long list of 
215. See Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at II. 
216. AMAR, supra note 8, at 17. 
217. See Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 12. 
218. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 156, at 37-41. 
219. The only support of any type that Amar offers is a reference to a Jaw review article that, 
in discussing free speech and press, does exactly what Professor Amar does: notes the placement of 
the protection in various documents and assumes, without support, that placement reflects signifi-
cance. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 316 n.42 (citing David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press 
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 482 (1983)). 
220. Virginia proposed both amendments to the text and a bill of rights. Amendments Pro-
posed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17-21. New York had a list of rights that it 
declared could not be abridged, a list of understandings, and a list of proposed amendments. 
Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, supra note 129, at 21-28. 
221. CONG. REG., Aug. 13, 1789, reprinted in DocUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 
112, 123. 
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desired amendments"222 for the same reason it was second on Madison's list: 
it amended a clause near the beginning of the Constitution. 
A look at state proposals suggests that tracking the Constitution was 
probably the basic (though not invariant) principle employed as states as-
sembled their lists. Massachusetts, for example, the first state to propose 
amendments, had nine. If one assumes their first proposed amendment (the 
prototype of our Tenth Amendment) was conceived as either an amendment 
to the preamble or a clause to be inserted at the start of Article I, these 
amendments track the order of the constitutional text with the exception that 
the three clauses concerning courts or juries (proposals six, seven, and eight) 
are sensibly clustered together rather than divided between Article I, Section 
9, Clause 3 and Article 3, Section 2 as Madison had done. 223 New Hampshire, 
the next state to propose a clause concerning representation, also placed that 
clause second, and it did so for a fairly straightforward reason: it adopted the 
Massachusetts amendments essentially word for word. It then added three 
224 
amendments at the end to make a total of twelve. These texts suggest that 
Professor Amar's assumption that the states listed their proposed amendments 
in order of importance is incorrect. 
The only hint Amar gives in his opening chapter as to why Congress's 
First Amendment was listed first appears in a footnote following this sen-
tence: "It is poetic that this amendment was first, for it responded to perhaps 
the single most important concern of the Anti-Federalists."225 The footnote 
suggests an alternative interpretation: "For a less poetic and more prosaic 
reason for the 'firstness' of the original First Amendment, see Chapter 2."226 
In that chapter, Professor Amar informs the reader that Madison intended 
that his amendments be inserted into the constitutional text and that their 
order tracked their would-be placement.227 But this point receives relatively 
little development, and Professor Amar makes no effort to link it back to his 
extended discussion of Congress's First Amendment in the previous chapter, 
even though it directly undercuts his thesis of that amendment's "firstness." 
Location can be a helpful guide to original meaning. In Part II, I sought 
to show how analyzing Madison's original proposal reveals that the provi-
sion that eventually became the Ninth Amendment was intended to gloss 
rights provisions that preceded it (rather than being linked with the Tenth 
Amendment that eventually came to follow it, as Amar argues).228 In the next 
Section, I will argue that the relationship between the Due Process Clause 
and the Grand Jury Clause is better understood when it is recognized that 
222. AMAR, supra note 8, at 14. 
223. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in DocuMEN-
TARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 14, 14-15. 
224. Amendments Proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (June 21, 1788), in Docu-
MENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 16, 16-17. 
225. AMAR, supra note 8, at 9. 
226. /d. 
227. !d. at 37. 
228. See supra Section II. B. 
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Madison wanted them inserted into different parts of the Constitution (a 
point Amar fails to recognize). Understanding the significance of location 
requires examining how the document was produced and discovering the 
interpretive assumptions that animated its drafters. Amar simply examines 
the document itself and imposes his own interpretive assumptions on the 
document. 
Some of the readings his technique produces are fascinating, but that 
does not mean that they are consistent with the original understanding. For 
example, although he attaches no significance to it, Amar compares the 
Fourteenth Article of the Bill of Rights as it emerged from the House with 
the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution. When the House concluded 
its work, Madison's proposal to guarantee individual rights against state 
governments-"No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the 
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases"229 -had been 
expanded in scope to include free speech and placed as the Fourteenth Arti-
cle in the proposal it sent the Senate: "No State shall infringe the right of 
trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom 
of speech, or of the press."230 (The Senate rejected the proposal.)231 Amar 
refers to the House's Fourteenth Article as "its prophetically numbered 
Fourteenth Amendment"232 and as the "presciently numbered Fourteenth."233 
While Amar does not, in fact, assign any significance to this coincidence, 
the happenstance illustrates how someone of Amar's creativity could find 
links that have nothing to do with the original understanding. His similar 
fixation on location, analyzed without regard to legislative history, leads him 
astray. 
The larger point here is that the founding generation did not assign a 
great deal of significance to placement. The way the Bill of Rights evolved 
reflects this fact. Unlike Amar, no one at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted assigned a great deal of significance to which amendment might be 
first, and they did not think it relevant which amendments were next to each 
other. 
A similar point can be made about the unamended Constitution. In The 
Document and the Doctrine, Professor Amar derives great significance from 
the Constitution's "large[] organizing schemas": 
Each of the three great departments-legislative, executive, judicial-is 
given its own separate article, introduced by a separate vesting clause. To 
read these three vesting clauses as an ensemble (as their conspicuously 
parallel language and parallel placement would seem to invite) is to see a 
plain statement of separated powers.234 
229. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. 
230. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 156, at 41. 
231. DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 41 n.J4. 
232. AMAR, supra note 8, at 22. 
233. /d. at 38. 
234. Amar, supra note I, at 30. 
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While the Supreme Court has not yet adopted Amar's stress on location 
and style, other scholars have adopted approaches that accord with Amar's. 
In an article of great influence, Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, the 
leading academic proponents of the unitary executive theory,235 have offered 
a comparison of the vesting clauses for each of the three branches as support 
for their argument that the President alone has the power to control execu-
tion of all federal laws: 
There are many reasons why the Vesting Clause of Article II must be read 
as conferring a general grant of the "executive Power"-a grant that is in 
tum defined and limited by the later enumerations in Article II, Section 2. 
To begin with, the Clause is linguistically and structurally similar to the 
Vesting Clause of Article III (and different from the Vesting Clause of Ar-
ticle 1). The Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III contain nearly identical 
language in parallel grammatical formulations. Both omit the "herein 
granted" qualification that appears in the Vesting Clause of Article I, and 
both confer general grants of power (executive or judicial) on federal gov-
ernmental entities that are then defined and limited by later provisions of 
Articles II and III. 236 
This basic constitutional structure was not, however, the subject of de-
bate at the Philadelphia convention. When the draft of the Constitution went 
to the Committee of Style and Arrangement for polishing at the end of the 
Convention's proceedings, the legislative power was the subject of Articles 
Three through Nine, the executive power was the subject of Article Ten, the 
judicial power was the subject of Article Eleven (along with the habeas cor-
pus provision), and the limitations on state power were in Articles Twelve 
and Thirteen. 237 
As its name suggests, the Committee of Style and Arrangement was not 
supposed to be concerned with substance. From the complex structure of the 
prior draft, the Committee created the three-article structure (with the ha-
beas-corpus provision and the limits on the power of the states inserted in 
Article I) with which we are all familiar today.238 It also added the "herein 
granted" language to the vesting clause of Article I, language which sup-
porters of the unitary executive find a powerful limit on congressional 
authority.239 This dramatic restructuring of the document was not debated on 
235. See MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1743 (1996). 
236. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-71 (1994) (footnote and emphasis omitted); see also Vikram David 
Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 203, 222-46 
(1995) (providing an intratextual analysis of voting amendments); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 
1175-86 (1992) (providing an intratextual analysis of vesting clauses). 
237. See Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
( 1787), in 2 RECORDS, supra note I 04, at 565-80. 
238. For the Report of the Committee of Style, see 2 RECORDS, supra note 104, at 590-603. 
239. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 236, at 563,570-71,574-75 (assigning significance 
to the fact that the vesting clause of Article I gives Congress the legislative powers "herein granted," 
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the convention floor. 240 The changes were considered stylistic rather than of 
great interpretive consequence. 
Thus both the legislative history of the Bill of Rights and the unamended 
Constitution indicate that to the limited extent that location is relevant to 
original meaning, the significance of location can be assessed only by close 
study of drafting history. Amar and other close-reading textualist scholars 
depart from the framework of the founding generation when they think that 
simply by looking at the placement of clauses in the Constitution, they can 
recapture original meaning. 
C. Substantive Coherence 
Again and again in his analysis of the Bill of Rights, Amar stresses 
collective rights and undervalues individual rights. Guiding this approach is 
his premise that the Constitution is substantively coherent, a premise he 
developed most fully in his article Intratextualism. This approach requires 
the Bill of Rights to be about something, to have "a grand idea." That grand 
idea, Amar argues, is "the rights of the people." In turn, "the core rights of 
'the people' were popular and populist rights .... "241 The Bill of Rights was 
fundamentally "an Anti-Federalist idea that moderate Federalists ultimately 
accepted and adjusted."242 This approach misses both that individual rights 
were important to framers of the Bill of Rights and that the Bill of Rights 
itself sought to protect both group rights and individual rights against the 
national government. 
In this Article, I have challenged Amar's account of the Ninth Amend-
ment, and I have argued that he misreads the First Amendment's right to 
petition and the Fourth Amendment. This Section begins by looking at two 
further examples of how Amar minimizes the role of individual rights in the 
Bill of Rights and elevates collective rights in a way that is inconsistent with 
the original understanding of the relevant clauses. Amar discounts the Due 
Process Clause and reads too much into the various jury clauses of the Bill 
of Rights (which, like the Ninth Amendment, Amar treats as important evi-
dence supporting his thesis). These are further examples of how Amar's 
search for a "grand idea" consistently leads him away from the Bill of 
Right's multifaceted original meaning. 
Amar's Bill of Rights makes an important contribution to our thinking 
about the document by highlighting its republican and collective aspects. 
But Amar focuses on this republican dimension and minimizes the liberal, 
individual-rights dimension that was of much greater concern to the foun-
ders. The narrative Amar offers to situate the Bill of Rights in a political 
context-supposedly reflecting the Anti-Federalist vision-is wrong. The 
whereas the vesting clauses of Articles n and III simply grant the Executive and the Courts the 
"executive Power" and the "judicial Power" without limitation). 
240. For the debate on the Committee's work, see 2 REcoRDS, supra note 104, at 607-40. 
241. AMAR, supra note 8, at 73. 
242. ld. at 302. 
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Anti-Federalists were, in fact, unhappy with the Bill of Rights. Finally, this 
Section argues that Amar's premise of "substantive coherence" misses the 
messiness of historical reality. 
Amar's treatment of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause illus-
trates how Amar's search for substantive coherence leads him to disregard 
evidence that does not fit his overall vision. The words of the clause reflect a 
concern with the protection of individual rights: "[N]or shall any person ... 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property."243 In his reading of the Bill of 
Rights, however, Amar limits his discussion of the clause to a sentence and a 
supporting textual footnote and, without acknowledging any paradox, offers 
the clause as support for his thesis of the centrality of collective rights in the 
Bill of Rights. 
Amar discusses the Due Process Clause while arguing that juries should 
be viewed as republican decision makers: "The Fifth Amendment due-
process clause implicated the jury even more directly [than the non-jury 
clauses of the Sixth Amendment], for its core meaning was to require lawful 
indictment or presentment by a grand jury."244 He concludes his paragraph 
on the Due Process Clause and the non jury clauses of the Sixth Amendment: 
"The jury summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of populism, federal-
ism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights."245 
Amar's contention about the "core meaning" of the Due Process Clause 
is a surprising claim for a textualist to make, particularly surprising for a 
holistic textualist who seeks the relationship between constitutional clauses. 
Amar is asking us to read the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as 
having a "core meaning" that simply restates the Fifth Amendment's Grand 
Jury Clause, a point he seems to acknowledge in a very oblique way in his 
footnote on the Due Process Clause.246 Since a textualist strongly presumes 
that each word in the Constitution has meaning rather than being surplusage, 
this apparent repetition logically leads to the question, why did the founders 
include a Due Process Clause? Amar does not address the issue, but the only 
rationale I can think of that he might offer would be that the Due Process 
Clause had some meaning at its "periphery" -some meaning other than pro-
tection of the grand-jury right-that led to its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 
But if that were the case, then the meaning at the periphery would necessar-
ily be a core meaning because it would be the reason for the inclusion of the 
clause in the first place. From a purely textualist viewpoint, then, Amar's 
contention about the core meaning of the clause does not hold together. 
243. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
244. AMAR, supra note 8, at 97. 
245. /d. 
246. He writes: "Here, as elsewhere, I do not argue that the clause cannot be applied beyond 
what I call its 'core' meaning. Indeed, refusal to do so here would render the provision wholly re-
dundant, as the Supreme Court has noted." !d. at 342 n.62 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856)). Amar does not actually spell out what 
the redundancy is. Several chapters later, however, in discussing the meaning of due process in 
1866, he observes "[t]here are also questions about redundancy if we assume that the Fifth Amend-
ment's due-process clause merely replicated its grand-jury clause." /d. at 202. 
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If Amar were offering such a hard-to-justify core meaning, one would 
expect him to do so on the basis of strong originalist evidence. But his evi-
dence is slight, and the sources he cites on do not actually support his 
reading. Amar relies on Alexander Hamilton, Justice Story, and Chancellor 
Kent in support of his proposition that the "core meaning [of due process] 
was to require lawful indictment or presentment by a grand jury."247 But in 
each of the three statements Amar cites, the author is referring to Lord 
Coke's definition of due process. These sources suggest that Lord Coke be-
lieved the core meaning of due process involved the grand jury, but they 
undercut Amar's claim that the conception of due process was similarly lim-
ited in the late-eighteenth-century United States. 
Amar quotes from Hamilton's 1784 Letter from Phocion: "If we enquire 
what is meant by the law of the land, the best commentators will tell us, that it 
means due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and 
lawful men,* and trial and conviction in consequence."248 The italicization 
and asterisk, which are in Hamilton's original letter, reflect the fact that 
Hamilton was quoting Coke, as Amar notes.249 Hamilton was not suggesting 
that Coke's definition reflected the core meaning of the clause. Indeed, 
Hamilton added the phrase "and trial and conviction in consequence" to 
Coke's definition because he did not believe the phrase was limited in the 
C k . d' d 250 way o e m tcate . 
In the Letter from Phocion, Hamilton is attacking state legislation that 
disfranchised and banished loyalists. Contrary to what Amar's analysis 
would suggest, Hamilton clearly views the core violation as legislation that 
led to the denial of a trial, not the fact that punishment was not preceded by 
an indictment. 251 
Amar's cites Story in this discussion but does not quote him.252 Amar 
does quote from the relevant section of Story's Commentaries on the Consti-
tution of the United States in his discussion of due process in the context of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: "Lord Coke says, that [the words by the law of 
the land] mean by due process of law, [which in turn means] due present-
ment or indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by due process 
247. /d. at 97, 342 n.62. 
248. /d. The full quote is from Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate 
Citizen of New York, reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 485 (Harold C. Syrett 
and Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). 
249. /d. 
250. See Hamilton, supra note 248, at 485. 
251. See, e.g., id. at 484 ("[T]hese men are advocates for expelling a large number of their 
fellow-citizens unheard, untried; or, if they cannot effect this, are for disfranchising them, in the 
face of the constitution, without the judgment of their peers, and contrary to the law of the land." 
(emphasis added)); id. at 485 ("[T]he legislature ... cannot, without tyranny, disfranchise or punish 
whole classes of citizens by general discriptions, without trial and conviction of offences known by 
laws previously established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty. This is a dictate of 
natural justice, and a fundamental principle of law and liberty." (emphasis added)). 
252. AMAR, supra note 8, at 342 n.62. 
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of the common law."253 Story, like Hamilton, is referring to the whole legal 
process, not simply to the initiation of it by the grand jury. Amar recognizes 
this in his discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment (although not in his dis-
cussion of the Fifth Amendment): "We need not say that due process in 
1866 meant nothing more than grand juries-Story and Stewart [an anti-
slavery writer] seemed to read the clause more sweepingly .... "254 There is 
no basis here for the argument that the right to presentment or indictment is 
the core meaning of the Due Process Clause. 
The passage from Chancellor Kent that Amar cites is one in which Kent 
discusses English usage. It is quoted in Amar's later discussion of Four-
teenth Amendment due process: "The words by the law of the land as used 
in magna charta ... are understood to mean due process of law, that is, by 
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men; and this, says Lord 
Coke, is the true sense and exposition of those words."255 As Amar notes in a 
parenthetical, Kent is "parroting Coke's definition of due process"256 : the 
passage does not reflect Kent's understanding of the phrases "law of the 
land" and "due process." In fact as chancellor, Kent played a critical role in 
the expansion of the concept of due process to include protection of vested 
rights. 257 In the important case of Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh,258 de-
cided well before Kent wrote his treatise, the chancellor invalidated a statute 
that allowed municipal trustees to block a stream that had previously flowed 
onto plaintiff's property: 
A right to a stream of water is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it 
flows. It is a part of the freehold of which no man can be disseised "but by 
lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of law." This is an ancient 
and fundamental maxim of common right to be found in magna charta, 
and which the legislature has incorporated into an act declaratory of the 
rights of the citizens of this state. 259 
The case involved a civil statute and had nothing to do with the grand-jury 
right that, according to Amar, Kent thought was at the core of due process. 
But there is no sense in the opinion that Kent thought he was operating at 
the periphery of due process. Rather, he refers to the right he is protecting as 
"sacred." 
Amar does not mention the early state case law that, by applying law-of-
the-land provisions to the review of civil legislation, cuts against his argu-
253. /d. at 200--01 (quoting 3 JosEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES§ 1783, at 661 (1833)). 
254. /d. at 2C I. 
255. /d. at 200--01 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW J3 (2d ed. 
1832)) (omission in original). 
256. /d. at 342 n.62. 
257. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 16 CaNST. CoMMENT 315, 334 (1999). 
258. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
259. Gardner, 2 Johns. Ch., at 165-{i6. 
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ment about the limited meaning of the Due Process Clause.260 Nor does he 
mention a critical piece of evidence indicating that the Grand Jury Clause 
and Due Process Clause had different areas of focus: in Madison's original 
proposal, the Due Process Clause was to be inserted into Article I while the 
Grand Jury Clause was to be inserted into Article III, but the Senate added 
the Grand Jury Clause to what became the Fifth Amendment only after it 
had stricken the clauses to which the Grand Jury Clause had originally been 
attached.261 This history suggests that the Due Process Clause was concerned 
with a broad range of process rights rather than being focused on the grand-
jury right. 
The misreading of the Due Process Clause is understandable, however, 
because it is driven by Amar's premise that the Bill of Rights had one grand 
idea: collective rights. His narrow conception of the Due Process Clause is a 
prerequisite to thinking about it as a collective right. If due process at its 
core implicates a range of process rights, its focus is logically the individual 
whose interests are protected. By asserting that the core meaning of the 
clause concerns grand juries, and by treating the Due Process Clause only in 
the context of his analysis of the importance of juries as community deci-
sion makers, Amar reads the Due Process Clause as if it involved simply the 
grand jury's right to decide. But even accepting Amar's assertion that the 
Due Process Clause is at its core about indictment and presentment, it is still 
the individual's right, not the community's right. That is clear from its text, 
and Amar offers no evidence that would indicate it should not be so viewed. 
By giving the Due Process Clause such strikingly short shrift-one sentence 
of text in the six chapters on the original understanding of the Bill of 
Rights-by limiting its focus, and by folding it into his discussion of "[t]he 
[c]entrality of the [j]ury,"262 Amar fails to confront important evidence that 
works against his claims. 
Amar's search for a grand idea underlying the Bill of Rights also leads 
him to misunderstand the jury clauses by significantly understating the ex-
tent to which they protect individual rights. Amar all but ignores the Due 
Process Clause and places juries at the center of his analysis: "Juries, guar-
anteed in no fewer than three amendments, were at the heart of the Bill of 
Rights."263 His chapter on juries is the longest chapter in the half of his book 
260. E.g., Den on demise of the Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805); 
State v. --, 2 N.C. 38 (I Hayw.) 28 (1794); Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (S.C. 
1796); Bowman v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 252 (S.C. 1792). On the equivalency of "law of the 
land" and "due process" in English usage, see 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 131, at 855-
56. 
261. See DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103 at 12 (providing Madison's original pro-
posal); id. at 39-40 (Article X of House Resolution and Articles of Amendment of August 24, 1789; 
Article X contained grand jury clause and other criminal procedure protections); id. at 40 & n.14 
(observing that on September 4, 1789 the Senate rejected all of Article X except for the grand jury 
clause and that on September 8, 1789, the Senate merged the grand jury clause into Article VIII). 
Article VIII was the precursor of our Fifth Amendment. See id. at 39 (providing Article VID as 
adopted by the House of Representatives). 
262. AMAR, supra note 8, at 96. 
263. ld. at 83. 
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devoted to the founders' Bill of Rights.264 To Professor Amar, the jury is 
above all an institution of popular rule, the mechanism by which the people 
decide: "[l]t is anachronistic to see jury trial as an issue of individual right 
rather than (also, and more fundamentally) a question of government struc-
ture."265 Thus if the founders' vision is to be honored, the defendant cannot 
waive his right to a jury because the fundamental commitment of the Bill of 
Rights is to the community's right to judge, not to the individual's right to 
be judged by the community.266 
Professor Amar's convincingly makes the case that the jury right was 
traditionally a right of the community as well as a right of the individual, 
and his view here accords with the historical scholarship. Thus Forrest 
McDonald has argued that Anti-Federalists championed a vision of the 
United States as "a nation composed of several thousand insular communi-
ties, each of which exercised virtually absolute powers over its members 
through two traditional institutions, the militias and the juries."267 Robert 
Palmer has written similarly that "jury trial was a better means for maintain-
ing local communal standards than for protecting individualliberties."268 
But Amar misses the rethinking of the jury's role that was already un-
derway in the revolutionary era.269 There was less reason to stress the jury as 
the defender of the people against the government when the people began to 
elect their government postindependence. For the first time, the jury became 
important as a check on majoritarian abuse of individual rights. It is signifi-
cant in this regard that the judicial-review cases of the revolutionary era for 
the most part involved individuals from unpopular groups-loyalists and 
creditors-who challenged statutes that took away their right to a jury 
trial. 270 These individuals sought jury trials not because they thought the 
community was favorable to them but because they wanted an avenue to 
challenge hostile legislative decision making. 
The 1787 North Carolina Supreme Court decision Bayard v. Singleton271 
supports this view of the right to a jury trial as an individual right. The court 
there invalidated a state statute that denied a jury trial to loyalists who chal-
264. See id. at 81-118. 
265. /d. at 104 (emphasis added). 
266. /d. at 104-10. 
267. McDoNALD, supra note 104, at 289. 
268. Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in LIBERTY AND CoMMUNITY: 
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, !OJ (1987); see also WILLIAM 
E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SociETY, 1760-1830, at 20-30 (1975); RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 297-302. 
269. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 110 (noting continuity of view of role of the jury during 
revolutionary era). 
270. See Treanor, supra note 7, at 474-87. In addition, Virginia's first instance of judicial 
review-the Case of the Prisoners-was also concerned with legislation affecting loyalists, al-
though the legislation implicated was a pardon statute, rather than a statute affecting the right to a 
jury trial. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Re-
view, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994). 
271. I N.C. (Mart.) 5 ( 1787). 
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lenged the confiscation of their property. In announcing its holding, the 
court spoke in the unmistakable vocabulary of individual liberty: 
[B]y the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a decision of 
his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legislature could take away 
this right, and require him to stand condemned in his property without a 
trial, it might with as much authority require his life to be taken away 
without a trial by jury, and that he should stand condemned to die, without 
the formality of any trial at all .... 212 
Consistent with this vision, the two jury clauses of the Bill of Rights that 
pertain to the criminal process are framed as individual rights. The Fifth 
Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Mili-
tia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... "273 The Sixth 
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "274 Only the 
Seventh Amendment's right to a civil jury trial is not explicitly framed as an 
individual right. But nor is it framed as a collective right: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.275 
Several state proposals present the civil jury trial right as a waivable indi-
vidual right. Massachusetts sought the following amendment: "In civil 
actions between Citizens of different States every issue of fact arising in 
Actions at common law shall be tried by a Jury if the parties or either of 
them request it."276 Roger Sherman's proposal was to the same effect: a right 
to jury trial in civil cases existed "if either party, request it."277 This legisla-
tive history suggests that the right to a civil jury trial, like the other two jury 
rights, was fundamentally understood as an individual right. 
The point here is not that the notion of jury as republican decision maker 
had disappeared by 1791, for it had not. I am contesting Amar's claim that 
jury trial was "more fundamentallr ... a question of government struc-
ture" than an "individual right."27 A basic premise underlying Amar's 
272. /d. at 7. 
273. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
274. ld. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
275. ld. amend. VII. 
276. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention, supra note 223, at 15. The 
Maryland Minority proposal and the New Hampshire proposal were also framed in terms of a waiv-
able individual right. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 506-07 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (reproducing proposals). 
277. Sherman, supra note 146, at 267. 
278. AMAR, supra note 8, at 104 (emphasis added). 
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textualism-that precise word choice is evidence of original understand-
ing-is correct (although it does not provide evidence as strong as Amar 
generally claims). The word choice reflected in the text of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment indicates that the right to a grand jury and to a jury trial 
were more fundamentally concerned with individual rights than with gov-
ernmental structure. The legislative history of the Seventh Amendment 
suggests the same result. 
There is a republican element of the Bill of Rights.279 Amar effectively 
argues that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of "powers ... to the peo-
ple"280 refers to powers that the people collectively hold,281 that the First 
Amendment's right of the people to assemble is primarily a collective 
right,282 and that the Second Amendment's "core concerns are populism and 
federalism."283 And concerns about community rights could reinforce con-
cerns about individual rights, as jury-trial rights did. But Amar pushes 
beyond these points, and his search for a grand theme behind the Bill of 
Rights leads him to misinterpret constitutional provisions and downplay 
evidence inconsistent with his theme. 
Perhaps no constitutional document can be substantively coherent if 
produced in a majoritarian fashion by participants with dramatically differ-
ent interests. But at the very least, the Bill of Rights fails to cohere in the 
way Amar would have it cohere. Amar suggests that republicanism was the 
dominant ideology at the time of the Bill of Rights and that it guided the 
construction of the Bill of Rights; the true picture is more complex, as histo-
rian Isaac Kramnick has observed: 
Federalists and Antifederalists ... tapped several languages of politics .... 
None dominated the field, and the use of one was compatible with the use 
of another by the same writer or speaker. There was a profusion and confu-
sion of political tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that 
clatter; it is we, two hundred and more years later, who chafe at their in-
consistency. 2114 
Drawing on the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, Mark Tushnet has used the 
term "bricolage"-"the assembly of something new from whatever materi-
als the constructors discovered"285 -to describe the founders' approach as 
they put together the Constitution, and the metaphor is an apt one. The Bill 
of Rights embraces both collective rights and individual rights. 
279. Robert Palmer has provided a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between republican-
ism and the Bill of Rights that, unlike Amar's account, treats republicanism as fundamentally 
concerned with the protection of individual liberty. See Palmer, supra note 268, at 105-117. 
280. U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
281. AMAR, supra note 8, at 119-24. 
282. /d. at 26-30. 
283. /d. at 46. 
284. ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA 26) (1990). 
285. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional ww, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1229 (1999). 
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But to the extent that one type of right was ascendant, it was individual 
rights. Amar's account of the revolutionary era is a static one. He misses the 
fact that during the revolutionary era, in response to assertions of state legis-
lative authority that they deemed unjust, many Americans came to rethink 
the belief that majorities could be relied on to protect individual rights: 
Americans entered the Revolutionary crisis confident that they knew what 
their rights were; after independence, they modified these ideas only mod-
estly. What did evolve, far more dramatically and creatively, were their 
ideas of where the dangers to rights lay and of how rights were to be pro-
tected. At the outset American believed that arbitrary acts of the Crown 
and its colonial officials, including judges of the higher courts, posed the 
greatest threat, and they accordingly treated the rights of representation 
and trial by jury as their chief securities against arbitrary rule. It took a 
decade of experience under the state constitutions to expose the triple dan-
ger that so alarmed Madison in 1787: first, that the abuse of the legislative 
power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive; second, that 
the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled from their rulers 
than to defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majori-
ties acting through government; and third, that agencies of central 
government were less dangerous than state and local despotisms. This 
reconception marked a significant departure in Anglo-American thinking 
about rights, and it helps to explain why Federalist qualms about the utility 
of bills of rights involved more than political oversight.286 
Similarly, Gordon Wood has observed that "[i]n 1776 the solution to the 
problems of American politics seemed to rest not so much in emphasizing 
the private rights of individuals against the general will as it did in stressing 
the public rights of the collective people against the supposed privileged 
interests of their rulers."287 By the end of the revolutionary era, thinking 
about rights had undergone a transformation: 
The liberty that was now emphasized was personal or private, the protec-
tion of individual rights against all governmental encroachments, 
particularly by the legislature, the body which the Whigs had traditionally 
cherished as the people's exclusive repository of their public liberty and 
the surest weapon to defend their private liberties. 288 
If Amar's account explained such evidence, the fact that it differs from that 
of leading historians such as Wood and Rakove would not matter. But in 
critical ways it does not explain such evidence, as my discussion of particu-
lar clauses has sought to show. 
At a broader level, Amar's account is also at odds with the ways in 
which the founders themselves understood the Bill of Rights. Madison's 
notes for his speech introducing the Bill of Rights and the newspaper ac-
counts of that speech show that he understood and defended the Bill of 
286. RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 289-90. 
287. GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 61 (1969). 
288. /d. at 609. 
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Rights as fundamentally concerned with the protection of individual rights 
against majorities. According to his notes, the amendments "relate 1st. to 
private rights."289 He adds that the amendments will "guard 1. vs Executive 
... 2. Legislature as in Sts-... 3. Majority of people."290 The newspaper 
account of the speech confirms that understanding: 
[I]n a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger 
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The 
prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be leveled against that quarter 
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest 
prerogative of power: But this is not found in either the executive or legis-
lative departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating 
by the majority against the minority.291 
Leading Anti-Federalists shared Madison's understanding of the Bill of 
Rights as primarily protective of individual rights. Where Amar contends 
that the Bill of Rights was "an Anti-Federalist idea that moderate Federalists 
ultimately accepted and adjusted,"292 the Anti-Federalists, in fact, were an-
gered that Madison's proposed Amendments were very different from the 
amendments they had called for during the constitutional-ratification de-
bates. Although they supported the protection of individual liberty, above all 
the Anti-Federalists desired structural limitations on federal power such as 
further limitations on direct taxation or barriers to ratification of treaties, as 
evidenced by North Carolina Federalist William Davie's reports to Madison 
on his home state's Anti-Federalists: "Instead of a Bill of rights attempting 
to enumerate the rights of the Indivi[du]al or the State Governments, they 
seem to prefer some general negative confining Congress to the exercise of 
the powers particularly granted, with some express negative restriction in 
some important cases."293 Madison gave them a very different Bill of Rights. 
The recurring image in the debate in Congress was that the Bill of Rights 
was a "tub to the whale," an allusion to Jonathan's Swift's Tale of a Tub. In 
that story, Swift told how sailors had thrown "an empty tub by way of 
amusement" to divert a whale from pursuing their ship.294 "Madison's con-
temporaries used the allusion to point out that he had proposed mostly 
rights-related amendments rather than ones designed to change the structure 
289. James Madison, Notes for Amendments Speech (1789), in 2 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 131, at I 042, I 042. 
290. /d. at 1043. 
291. CoNG. REG., supra note 144, at 81. While in certain ways Madison's thought was inno-
vative and perhaps not completely understood by his contemporaries, the concerns he had about 
abuses by state governments were widely shared, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 611, 625-26 (1999), and it is this concern about majoritarian abuse that Madison's 
speech about the Bill of Rights highlights. 
292. AMAR, supra note 8, at 302. 
293. Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), in DocuMENTARY 
RECORD, supra note 103, at 245, 246. 
294. DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at XV. 
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or essence of the new government. The Antifederal leviathan would be di-
verted and the ship of state could sail away intact."295 
During the ratification debate, the Anti-Federalists-the true champions 
of a federal system-had been outmaneuvered by the Federalists, who had 
seized the politically potent Federalist rubric and reduced their opponents to 
defining themselves by their opposition. Something very similar happened 
in the battle over the Bill of Rights: Madison shifted the ground under the 
Anti-Federalists. Madison proposed a Bill of Rights that was centrally con-
cerned with individual liberties. The Federalists grasped this. "I thank you 
for the copy of the amendments proposed to the constitution which you 
lately inclosed to me," Joseph Jones, a Virginia Federalist, wrote to Madison 
when he received a copy of his proposed Bill of Rights: "[T]hey are calcu-
lated to secure the personal rights of the people so far as declarations on 
paper can effect the purpose, leaving unimpaired the great Powers of the 
government .... "296 William Smith, a congressman from South Carolina, 
reviewed the amendments as they emerged from the House committee and 
observed "[t]here appears to be a disposition in our house to agree to some, 
which will more effectually secure private rights, without affecting the 
structure of the Govt."297 The Anti-Federalists understood as well. "[T]he 
Enumeration stops at direct Taxation Treatys Trade," Patrick Henry com-
plained to William Grayson, an Anti-Federalist senator from Virginia.298 
Grayson, in an earlier letter to Henry, had reached the same conclusion: 
"[L]ast munday [sic] a string of amendments were presented to the lower 
House; these altogether respected personal liberty ... .''299 
Perhaps because the Bill of Rights is so principally concerned with indi-
vidual liberty, scholars have often (although not always) overlooked its 
republican elements.300 Amar's account is a valuable corrective in this re-
gard. But his notions that there is a "grand idea" of the Bill of Rights and 
that "popular and populist rights"301 were at the core of the document ob-
scure much more than they illuminate. Amar seeks a coherence that does not 
exist and dramatically overemphasizes the republican aspects of the Bill of 
Rights. His textualism leads him astray. 
295. !d. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a classic study of the historian's craft, James West Davidson and 
Mark Hamilton Lytle offered a hypothetical account of how the seventeenth-
century explorer John Smith might have described a baseball game between 
the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox: 
[T]hey being assembled about a great field of open grass, a score of their 
greatest men ran out upon the field, adorned each in brightly hued jackets 
and breeches, with letters cunningly woven upon their Chestes, and wear-
inge hats uppon their heades, of a sort I know not what. One of their chiefs 
stood in the midst and would at his pleasure hurl a white ball at another 
chief, whose attire was of a different colour, and whether by chance or ar-
tyfice I know not the ball flew exceeding close to the man yet never injured 
him, but sometimes he would strike att it with a wooden club and so 
giveing it a hard blow would throw down his club and run away. '02 
The hypothetical account is based on close scrutiny of the game, but it is 
completely wrong because the observer "reported events as he saw them"303 
rather than in accordance with the perspective of the participants. 
This Article has used Akhil Amar's Bill of Rights, a leading work of the 
textualist movement and the product of the movement's leading scholar, as a 
case study to illustrate the dramatic gap between a textualist reading of the 
Constitution and the way in which the document was originally read. 
Amar's account is not unlike the hypothetical Smith's: Smith's description 
fails because, while it reflects careful study, it also reflects Smith's perspec-
tive, not the perspective of the participants. Amar's account reflects a close 
reading of the text, but it fails because it reflects Amar's perspective, not that 
of the eighteenth century. 
Professor Amar's textualism reflects a series of assumptions: that the 
reader can learn about the meaning of constitutional text by looking at the 
placement of that text in the document; that words used at different places in 
the document should be construed to mean the same thing; and that the 
document reflects a one-dimensional, substantively coherent vision. In his 
study of the Bill of Rights, Amar draws on these techniques to "offer an in-
tegrated overview of the Bill of Rights as originally conceived."304 He 
concludes that "the grand idea of the original Bill of Rights" was not the 
rights of the individual, but "the rights of the people."305 
This Article has sought to show that the interpretation Amar advances of 
the Bill of Rights is deeply flawed and that those flaws are in significant part 
the product of Amar's textualism: he accords significance to placement 
when he should not, he misreads what the founders meant when they repeat-
edly referred to "the rights" of "the people," and he imposes on the Bill of 
302. JAMES WEST DAVIDSON & MARK HAMILTON LYTLE, AITER THE fACT: THE ART OF 
HISTORICAL DETECTION 6 (1982). 
303. /d. at 2. 
304. AMAR, supra note 8, at xii. 
305. /d. at 133. 
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Rights a one-dimensional vision that it did not possess. Amar assumes that 
the interpretive premises of his textualism capture the founders' approach to 
the Bill of Rights without probing to determine whether this is in fact cor-
rect, and this Article has shown that that assumption repeatedly leads to 
grave misreadings. It would appear that the Bill of Rights-because it is a 
large body of constitutional text produced at one time and in large part writ-
ten by one person-would represent the best test case for close-reading 
textualism. But Amar's application of his interpretive approach to the Bill of 
Rights leads to a fundamentally erroneous understanding of individual 
clauses and of the document as a whole. 
This evidence is of value because it shows that Amar's broadly influen-
tial reading of the Bill of Rights as republican is erroneous: his account 
dramatically understates how the Bill of Rights protects individual rights. 
Moreover, a careful study of Amar's argument illustrates that textualism-
with its focus on text and its comparative (or complete) disregard of the 
drafting and ratification history that is central to originalism-is ill-
equipped to recover original meaning. The flaws of originalism are well 
chronicled. In particular, drafting and ratification history are imperfect 
guides to how the document was understood because they may reflect idio-
syncratic views of the speakers rather than generally held understandings. 
Recognition of these flaws played a critical role in the rise of textualism and 
its premise that modem constitutional lawyers should seek to recover origi-
nal public meaning rather than either the framers' or ratifiers' intent. But the 
interpretive tools employed by textualists such as Amar are flawed guides to 
original public meaning. 
This Article shows the dramatic gap between the Constitution's original 
meaning and modem textualist readings. A textualist like Amar reads the 
constitutional text in a way that reflects current conceptions rather than a 
method informed by carefully studying the evolution of the Constitution 
through the process of drafting and by carefully studying what the founding 
generation understood the document to mean. Precisely because it mini-
mizes the significance of the historical evidence that originalists rely on to 
uncover original intent and original understanding, textualism offers a poor 
guide to original public meaning. The textualist search for original public 
meaning can succeed only if textualists give the evidence that originalists 
highlight-drafting history and ratification history-careful attention and 
great weight. 
